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The Significance of §§76 and 77 Of the *Critique of Judgment* for the Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy (Part 1)

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By the end of 1790, shortly after reading Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Goethe noted, under the title "Metamorphosis of Plants: Second Essay,"

> Now the investigator of nature can put his mind at ease and continue on his way all the more undisturbed, given that the newer philosophical school will be obliged to make more current this mode of presentation according to its teacher's prescribed direction (see Kant's "Critique of Teleological Judgment," especially §§[76, 77]),[1] and the investigator of nature must subsequently not miss the opportunity to have a say in the discussion as well.[2]

The mode of presentation that Goethe speaks of here is the view that we can ascribe no objective purposiveness to living, organized nature—a position for which Kant had provided the philosophical justification in §§76 and 77 of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment."[3] What is remarkable, however, is Goethe's astonishing confidence that the new philosophers, who wanted to succeed and surpass Kant, would have to deal especially with these sections and the mode of presentation sketched there. To what extent was he right and his confidence justified?

I begin with the observation that, already in 1795, in his early text, *Of the I as Principle of Philosophy*, Schelling had made the sections in question completely his own, and writes of them: "There have perhaps never been so many deep thoughts gathered together in so few pages as occur in §76 of the critique of teleological judgment."[4] A few years later Schelling writes to Fichte, regarding the latter's claim that the identity of ideal and real ground is equally the identity of thought and intuition, "With this identity, you express the highest speculative idea, the idea of the absolute, the intuition of which lies in thought, the thought

of which lies in intuition. (For the sake of brevity, I direct your attention to §76 of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*.)"[5]

And Hegel, too, wrote, already in his earliest Jena publications, that with the idea of an archetypal [*urbildlichen*] understanding, Kant had expressed precisely the highest speculative idea in §§76 and 77 that now had to be picked up and developed, since Kant had indeed identified it, but then, subsequently and indeed haphazardly, robbed it of its speculative potential:

> The truly speculative aspect of Kant's philosophy can only consist in the Idea being thought and expressed so definitely, and the pursuit of this side of his philosophy is the only interesting aspect of it. This makes it all the harder to see the Rational being muddled up again, and not just that, but to see the highest Idea corrupted with full consciousness, while reflection and finite cognition are exalted above it.[6]

Even an initial, brief glimpse thus allows us to recognize Goethe's prediction as astonishingly accurate. But how is it that just these two sections of the *Critique of Judgment* should bring about such stimulation and effect?

1.

Kant had argued in the previous sections of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment" that certain products of nature, namely, so-called organisms, compel us to move beyond a purely mechanistic way of looking at things and bring into their assessment concepts of purpose as well. This seems to amount to an antinomy, since mechanism and purposiveness, as far as we can see, cannot both be the explanatory ground of the same object. Kant's solution is that in actuality this antinomy is not an antinomy at all, or rather, it simply resolves itself: Mechanism and teleology are for the power of judgment two maxims of the empirical description of nature, which would only contradict one another if brought in *constitutively* for the explanation of the possibility of objects. But these maxims can only be regulative, insofar as the power of judgment, which itself has no constitutive principles at its disposal, must reflect on *already given* objects of experience. Consequently, they can only refer to the purposive application of our subjective cognitive capacities, and cannot determine any objects.

Kant then adds a "Comment" to this resolution to the antinomy in §76, which, as he says, "would greatly deserve elaborate treatment in transcendental philosophy."[7] That is, it not only provides the grounds for the proposed solution, but also, on the basis of three examples, Kant attempts to show, generally and for all three human cognitive capaci-

ties, that certain ideas of reason can be irrefutably valid for us—and indeed, for the entire human species—without it following that the ground of this validity lies in objects themselves. In fact, the constitution of our cognitive capacities forces us toward a certain way of approaching nature, but we cannot justifiably presuppose correspondence to its objects.

Kant's first example of such a case is the distinction between the possibility and actuality of things, which for our theoretical purposes is unavoidable. This distinction presupposes two heterogeneous but mutually related cognitive capacities, namely, understanding and sensible intuition: What is given to us in sensibility is actual; what is not given, but can be thought without contradiction, is possible. For human cognition, both understanding and intuition are equally necessary; through mere thinking no object can be given to us, through our intuition alone no object can be known. If through thinking alone the corresponding objects were at the same time given, then for us there would be nothing but actuality. Our understanding is however not intuitive but discursive, and therefore, dependent on an intuition, something sensible that is receptive or passive. But this cannot be presupposed for every knowing being. Thus, Kant writes, "[T]he two propositions, that things can be possible without being actual, and that consequently one cannot at all infer actuality from mere possibility, do indeed hold for human reason. And yet this does not prove that the distinction lies in things themselves" (CJ 402).

Kant's second example is taken from the practical realm. Here, I am forced as a finite rational being to attribute to myself a free causality together with the moral law, which renders certain actions as objectively necessary. But since I am at the same time a sensible being and a part of nature, actions that are prescribed as necessary by reason are, according to the causality of natural laws, always contingent, and hence may fail to materialize. The moral law thus appears under the name of duty and as a command: reason expresses the appropriate necessity of the moral law not through what *is* or what actually occurs, but through an *ought-to-be* [Sein-Sollen]. Such a distinction would not exist for a reason that can be effective without sensibility as a subjective condition of its operation. The difference between "obligation and action, between a practical law that says what is possible through our doing, and the theoretical law that says what is actual through our doing" (CJ 404), is thus only valid for a practical being who is both rational and sensible, and whose causality does not coincide with that of the sensible, empirical world.

The third example, finally, is the one for the sake of which these considerations are ultimately employed, and that resumes the discussion

of the preceding sections of the "Dialectic of Teleological Judgment." Here, since our understanding, as discursive in cognition, must always proceed from universals to particulars, it can reach no cognitive judgment with regard to the lawfulness of organic natural objects so long as no universal law is recognized under which these objects can be subsumed and out of which their particularity can be derived. But we do not know such a law. Moreover, according to Kant, an organism is characterized by the fact that, as a product of *nature*, the parts and the whole must mutually, *through themselves*, be cause and effect of one another (see CJ 373). Now, we ourselves can indeed easily think a causation of the whole by its parts, namely, mechanically; but we know the causation of parts by the whole only through the sole case in which the *idea* of the whole precedes the generation of the parts as their purpose and underlies them as their ground: "strictly speaking, therefore, the organization of nature has nothing analogous to any causality known to us" (CJ 375). But, because of the discursivity of our understanding, we cannot help but think the possibility of organisms as following principles of purpose (for it is not to be understood through "blind," mere mechanistic laws of motion), and hence

> the concept of the purposiveness that nature displays in its products must be one that, while not pertaining to the determination of objects themselves, is nevertheless a subjective principle that reason has for our judgment, since this principle is necessary for human judgment in dealing with nature. The principle is regulative (not constitutive), but it holds just as necessary for our *human judgment* as it would if it were an objective principle. (CJ 404)

In connection with these three examples, Kant adds two more considerations, which are of particular interest for my topic. The first connects immediately to the reflections on possibility and actuality in §76; the second takes up the third example and comprises the content of §77.

(1) In order to reaffirm the claim that it is only a feature of our human cognitive capacities that possibility and actuality become distinguished and can fall apart, Kant points out that our reason "demands that we assume something or other (the original basis [*Urgrund*]) as existing with unconditioned necessity, something in which there is no longer to be any distinction between possibility and actuality" (CJ 402). This thought is found in an early form already in the *Nova Dilucidatio* and in the *Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, where it is used in addition for a proof of God. It is then also found in modified form in a chapter in the *Critique of Pure Reason* titled, "The Transcendental Ideal." There, Kant argues that for all things of experience, a "transcendental substrate" as "the *sum of all*

possibility" must be thought, that is, an "All of Reality" (*omnitudo realitatis*), which contains the entire material for all possible predicates of things and which thereby makes possible complete determination in general.[8] The same thought is then—in an again somewhat modified form—taken up by Jacobi in the second edition of his book, *On the Teachings of Spinoza in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn*,[9] and brought especially to the attention of the young students of Tübinger Stift, who henceforth strove for a synthesis of Kant and Spinoza. Jacobi had used the Kantian thought to replace Spinoza's concept of Substance with the thought of a being [*Sein*] that underlies all existence [*Dasein*], and hence cannot be thought as a *mere possibility*, a mere thought without actuality.[10] This being must therefore be assigned the modal determination of necessity. For Kant in the *Critique of Judgment*, the thought of such an original basis [*Urgrund*] is indeed an indispensable idea of reason, "but for human understanding an unattainable problematic concept" (CJ 402). Thus, Kant knows no way to think such a being and its mode of existence without recourse to something merely thought (i.e., merely possible) or merely intuited (merely actual). What matters for Kant in this context alone is the fact that it is the constitution of our cognitive capacities that makes it necessary to distinguish between possibility and actuality. For an understanding that was not dependent on passively received material for its own mode of employment, this distinction would not occur.

(2) Kant's second additional reflection connects with the third example mentioned above. If the apparent antinomy between mechanism and teleology is supposed to be explained and hence also resolved by reference to the special nature of human cognition, "then we must here," Kant writes, "be presupposing the idea of some possible understanding different from the human one (just as, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we had to have in mind a possible different intuition if we wanted to consider ours as a special kind, namely, as an intuition for which objects count only as appearances)" (CJ 405).

The reason for this is that organisms are contingent and cannot themselves be derived from the universal laws of nature prescribed by our understanding. As products of nature, however, they must also be thought as lawful and in harmony with the unity of the cognition of nature. Since the lawfulness of what is contingent is called purposiveness (see CJ 404), we must regard organisms *as if* the presentation of a purpose (and with it, another understanding) lies at their ground, and hence makes possible the unity of nature's lawfulness:

> How then can we at least conceive of the possibility of such a harmony—one that is presented as contingent and hence as possible only through a purpose that aims at it—between the things of

> nature and our judgment? To do this, we must at the same time conceive of a different understanding: without as yet attributing any [concept of a] purpose to this understanding, we can then present this harmony between the [particular] natural laws and our judgment as *necessary* relative to that understanding, [even though] our own understanding can conceive of this harmony only as mediated by purposes. (CJ 407; cf. 180)

Thus, Kant does not claim that such a (divine) understanding exists, nor that organisms actually presuppose the presentation of a purpose for their possibility. He only claims that the discursive nature of our cognition forces on us both the concept of a natural purpose and the idea of such an understanding, from which the peculiar character of natural purposes could be lawfully derived. However, when Kant subsequently characterizes this understanding as intuitive, as one that "proceeds from the *synthetically universal* (the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts[, and] hence [does not contain in] its presentation of the whole [any] contingency in the combination of the parts in order to make a determinate form of the whole possible" (CJ 407), it becomes at the same time clear that this other understanding, which must be thought if we are to be able to resolve the antinomy of teleological judgment, need not even be a divine understanding or cause of the world. It is enough that it is an intuitive understanding, one that proceeds from the whole to the parts, and the question of whether or not this understanding also brought the whole into being as a cause, can be left open. As Kant explicitly emphasizes, "[this does not imply] that the basis that makes such products of nature possible could not be found, even by an understanding different from (higher than) the human one, in the very mechanism of nature, i.e., in a causal connection that does not necessarily [*ausschließungsweise*] presuppose an understanding as cause" (CJ 406).

This is the proper result of §77. The antinomy of teleological judgment leads, in fact, to the idea of another possible understanding different from our own. However, in order to understand that the concept of a natural purpose is caused by the discursivity of our understanding, we need in the end only the *possibility* of a non-discursive understanding, just as in the *Critique of Pure Reason* we are obliged to consider only the possibility of a non-sensible intuition, in order to be able to think sensible objects simultaneously as appearances. For a non-discursive, that is, "intuitive" understanding, there would be no distinction between the mechanism and technic of nature, and consequently no antinomy. The possibility of conceiving of such an intuitive understanding thus substantiates, according to Kant, that the origin of the concept of a natural purpose (and with it, the corresponding antinomy of teleolog-

ical judgment) has its basis in "the Peculiarity of the Human Understanding," as it is called in the section title of §77.

The cited examples thus serve a double objective: on the one hand, to explain to us the peculiarity of our cognitive make-up; and, on the other, to lead us quite plainly to the necessity of at least thinking an alternative cognitive capacity, such that we do not hold that ours is the only one possible. In contrast to the earlier sporadic notes on an alternative form of intuition in the first *Critique*, Kant now carries out his considerations systematically and for all mental capacities equally—for cognitive capacities, powers of desire, and judgment: *Because* we have in the understanding and sensibility two stems of cognition independent of one another, we must distinguish between possibility and actuality (otherwise we would have an intellectual intuition); *because* we are both sensible and rational beings, the moral law appears to us as what ought to be, not as what is or volition (otherwise we would have a holy will); *because* our understanding is discursive, the power of judgment judges organisms inevitably as natural purposes (otherwise we would have an intuitive understanding). And since Kant in all three cases insists that the ground for our corresponding judgments lies in our subjective character and not in things themselves, he draws for us general limits of cognition and at the same time indicates that it is necessary to attempt to think beyond those limits, at least experimentally. Such an attempt, if undertaken seriously, will hardly be without consequences.[11] I will return to this point shortly.

First, it is necessary to see that, with these reflections, Kant brings not one, but two alternative cognitive capacities into play, which are by no means reducible to one another: a non-sensible, i.e., intellectual intuition, for which possibility (thought) and actuality (being) coincide; and an intuitive understanding, which proceeds from the intuition of the whole to the parts and hence knows no contingency in the connection of parts to the whole. The latter is discussed in §77, the former in §76. Although both are always identified with one another in the literature,[12] they are not the same: in the first case the alternative is between receptivity and spontaneity, in the second case the alternative is between a discursive and intuitive understanding. Let us look at both capacities more precisely.

1.1 Intellectual Intuition

When Kant says in the above-cited passage that we must form an idea of another possible understanding, just as we had in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to think another possible, that is, intellectual intuition, he is referring particularly to the revised deduction of the categories in

the second edition. There, he had insisted no less than six times[13] that the deduction is valid only for an understanding that does not produce or actualize its own objects, but whose entire capacity exists to combine *a priori* and bring together the manifold of given intuition under the unity of apperception. If thought and intuition were for us one and the same act, then a deduction of the categories would not only be impossible, but also superfluous:

> An understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition—an understanding, that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time exist—would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. For the human understanding, however, which thinks only, and does not intuit, that act is necessary. (CPR B139)

However, Kant also speaks in §77 of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment" of intellectual intuition as a conceivable intuition of the non-sensible substrate of appearances, and thus of things in themselves, linking this with corresponding remarks in the "Phenomena and Noumena" chapter in the first *Critique*. There he had also explicitly pointed out that our mode of intuiting things is to be distinguished from the way things are constituted in themselves, and that our sensibility must not be taken as the only possible way of intuiting things: "If we understand by [a noumenon] an *object* of a *non-sensible intuition*, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility" (CPR B307). Kant claims that it is "indispensable" to form such a concept (CPR A256), in order to set limits on our own sensibility. However, the intellectual intuition that is brought into play here is not identical to the productive intuition referred to in the deduction, so that we have to distinguish more precisely between two meanings of the concept of "intellectual intuition"—one, immediate and direct because it is a productive intuition,[14] and the other, immediate and direct because it is a non-sensible intuition.[15]

1.2 Intuitive Understanding

Interestingly, with regard to the intuitive understanding, we also notice a double meaning. Just as Kant had distinguished, in the earlier sections of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment," between the purposiveness in individual products of nature on the one hand and the purposiveness of the whole of nature on the other, his characterization of intuitive understanding oscillates between two corresponding possibili-

ties. On the one hand, Kant characterizes this understanding merely "negatively, merely as one that is not discursive" that "does not (by means of concepts) proceed from the universal to the particular and thus to the individual" (CJ 406). Such an understanding can also, in individual products of nature, represent "the possibility of the parts, in their character and combination, as dependent on the whole" and thus determine the particular from the "*synthetic universal*" (CJ 407).[16] Yet, on the other hand, it is also described as an understanding that reflects upon nature as a whole, "indeed . . . the whole of nature as a system" (CJ 409) that would thereby be thought by us as an original understanding, "as cause of the world" (CJ 410). Here the greatest proximity between intuitive understanding and productive, intellectual intuition undoubtedly occurs; although the latter must naturally not be thought equally as cause of the whole of the world, nevertheless this possibility must at least be allowed.

Thus, in §§76 and 77 of the "Critique of Teleological Judgment," we have to distinguish each time between two cognitive capacities that are, for Kant, thinkable but not realizable, which again themselves have two different interpretive possibilities:

(1) intellectual intuition as (a) the productive unity of possibility (thought) and actuality (being); and (b) the nonsensible intuition of things in themselves; and

(2) intuitive understanding as (a) the synthetically universal understanding; and (b) original understanding, or rather, as the cause of the world.

To my knowledge, none of the thinkers who regarded their task as progressing with Kant beyond Kant considered it possible to realize (1)(b) or (2)(b). If there are things in themselves as the non-sensible correlates of appearances, then these things are by definition not intuitable through sensibility. If we are finite rational beings, then we are by definition not the origin of the world. Yet, as is well known, one of the most important early steps beyond Kant consists in the claim that (1)(a), thus the unity of thought and being, is conceivable in an intellectual intuition, and that the transcendental substrate, or "All of Reality," is not to be sought outside of cognizing subjectivity, but rather must be immanent to it. This is the point of departure both for Fichte and the early Schelling (though not entirely in the same way). I would like to assume this as well-known and not address this further in what follows. Instead, I would like to put forward the thesis that, immediately following Kant, the possibility of an intuitive understanding in the sense of (2)(a), i.e., a synthetically universal understanding, was also maintained first by Goethe. I begin with a somewhat more extensive quotation from Goethe.

2.

> In my efforts to utilize if not actually master the Kantian theory, it sometimes seemed to me as if the worthy man were proceeding roguishly and ironically, at one point appearing to set narrow limits for our cognitive capacity and at another beckoning us furtively beyond them. To be sure, he may have noticed how arrogantly and cockily a man proceeds when, unencumbered by much experience, he straightaway and unthinkingly rejects one consideration in a premature endeavor to establish another, or links up the subjects under study with some caprice or other flitting through his mind at one moment. Our master thus restricts his thinkers to reflective and expository judgment, sternly forbidding determinative judgment; but after driving us sufficiently into a corner and even bringing us to despair, he suddenly decides in favor of the most liberal interpretations and allows us to make what use we will of the freedom he has in some measure vouchsafed for us.
>
> In this connection the following passage was highly significant to me:
>
> > But we can also conceive of an understanding that, unlike ours, is not discursive but intuitive, and hence proceeds from the *synthetically universal* (the intuition of a whole as a whole) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts . . . . [Here], [w]e do not have to prove that such an *intellectus archetypus* is possible. Rather, we must prove only that the contrast [between such an intellect and] our discursive understanding—an understanding which requires images (it is an *intellectus ectypus*)—and the contingency of its having this character leads us to that idea (of an *intellectus archetypus*), and we must prove that this idea does not involve a contradiction. [CJ 407–8]
>
> To be sure, the author seems to be referring here to a divine understanding; yet since it is possible in the moral realm to ascend to a higher plane, drawing close to the Supreme Being through faith in God, virtue, and immortality, the same might well hold true in the intellectual realm. Through intuition of ever-creative Nature we might make ourselves worthy of participating intellectually in her productions. Had I myself not ceaselessly pressed forward to the archetype, though at first unconsciously, from an inner drive; had I not even succeeded in evolving a method in harmony with Nature? What then was to prevent me from courageously embarking upon the adventure of reason, as the old gentleman of Königsberg himself calls it?[17]

Goethe had presented the first example of such a method in harmony with nature in his *Metamorphosis of Plants*. It is therefore already of philosophical interest, but it also arose from a "Spinoza controversy" with Jacobi. Besides the well-known dispute between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, whose significance for the development of post-Kantian

philosophy has meanwhile been well documented,[18] there was a second "Spinoza controversy" that took place at the same time and that is no less important for philosophical development after Kant, but which German idealism scholarship has thus far hardly taken notice of: the dispute between Jacobi and Goethe.

In the fall of 1784, Jacobi went on a twelve-day visit to Weimar, and brought with him the manuscript, "On the Teachings of Spinoza in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn." Goethe read it in great detail, followed by a new and intensive reading of Spinoza's *Ethics*. Soon after, Goethe told Jacobi in a letter of his completely different interpretation of this text. Jacobi saw in Spinoza an atheist; Goethe however called him "*theissimum*, even *christianissimum*." Indeed, he recognized a divine being above all "*in herbis et lapibus*,"[19] and in the "*rebus singularibus*[20] . . . the close and deep contemplation of which no one can encourage more than Spinoza."[21] In a subsequent letter to Jacobi, he makes himself even more clear:

> When you say that one can only believe in God, I say to you that I value perception [*schauen*] highly, and when Spinoza speaks of *scientia intuitiva* and says, 'this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the knowledge of the essence of things' [EIIp40s2—Trans.], these few words give me courage to devote all my life to the contemplation of things . . . and of whose essential forms I can hope to develop an adequate idea, without worrying in the least how far I will go.[22]

Henceforth, Goethe dedicated himself almost tirelessly to this task. Soon after that, he reported from Italy to Herder, in a clear allusion to Jacobi, that he had, "especially in botany, arrived at a ἓν καὶ πᾶν," which filled him with amazement.[23] The result is the well-known *Metamorphosis of Plants* published in 1790, which developed during the Italian journey and that is the "method in harmony with nature" and the intuitive mode of thinking that he believed to be the Kantian "adventure of reason."

3.

For Goethe as well as for Kant, intuitions without concepts are blind. But how do I grasp an intuited living thing? This is not only something in a state of change; something living is above all in a state of situated becoming and constant development. In order to grasp the becoming of something living, the concept(s) in question must not be fixed in the sense of *definition* (derived from the Latin for "boundary"). But for Kant, this is the case for every empirical concept. Such a concept is always a universal representation that contains within itself as parts

various representations or predicates that are themselves acquired from given objects through comparison, reflection, and abstraction. It is essentially "in opposition to intuition."[24] Kant had expressed this point in one of his lectures on metaphysics: The human capacity to think, he says, is the capacity

> to represent something through concepts, i.e., to represent something discursively, by abstracting from other things and taking only what is common to them all. In this way I acquire a mark [*Merkmal*], and if it is a ground of cognition, it is a concept. A being that abstracts limits itself. Humans have to limit themselves in this manner if they are to cognize, if they want to think; for the understanding is not a faculty of intuition.[25]

The concept thus removes something that is thought from the actual intuited thing, fixes it, and presents it as something universal; since I can make no use of concepts other than in judgment (see CPR A68), a judgment of cognition will always be a function of the relation between concepts of cognized presentations. Thus we understand why according to Kant a natural purpose must be ungraspable by determinative judgment: With regard to the possibility of such things it can only judge according to concepts of a preceding (external) cause, that is, either theoretically according to the principle of mechanism (mere laws of motion) or practically according to final causes (causality according to purposes) (see CJ 390). However, for a natural purpose it is required that the parts mutually produce one another according to their form and connection, and the "connection of *efficient causes* could at the same time be judged to be a *causation through final causes*" (CJ 373). Yet we cannot conceive of such a thing: the organism therefore remains a "stranger in natural science" (CJ 390), for "reason is quite unable to prove the concept of a natural purpose, i.e., that it has objective validity" (CJ 396).

Goethe's way of approaching the problem is entirely different. Just as I cannot assemble a living plant from detached leaves, stems, and flowers, I cannot, according to Goethe, progress toward a comprehension of a developing plant out of abstracted universal concepts of leaf, stem, and flower. Thus, arriving at an understanding of what is living requires "that my thinking is never divorced from objects, that the elements of the objects and my intuition of them interpenetrate, become fused in the process of thought; that my intuition is itself thinking, and my thinking is itself intuiting."[26] That is, I must find a possibility to make the concept so moveable and changeable that it can take place together with the development of its object. More precisely, I must immerse thought in intuition, must make the concept with which the object's initial state is thought so plastic and fluid that the concept

itself develops along with the metamorphosizing object: "What has been formed is immediately transformed again, and if we wish to achieve, to a certain degree, a living intuition of nature, we must see that we remain as mobile and plastic as the example nature provides us."[27] This is easily said, but what can we make of it?

As an initial way into this question, the following clue from Goethe might help:

> Two demands are produced in us by the contemplation of natural appearances: to become completely acquainted with the appearances themselves, and to take them in through reflection [Nach*denken*] . . . . When we assess an object in all its parts, when we are able to correctly grasp and reproduce it in the mind, then we may say, that we intuit it in real and higher senses . . . . And so the particular always leads us to the universal, the universal to the particular.[28]

The first of the two demands, to become completely acquainted with the appearances themselves, is relatively easy to fulfill. It is handled by the so-called "diversification [*Vermannigfaltigung*] of every individual experiment,"[29] that is, roughly, the observation of the development of a plant from seed to fruit, an animal from birth to natural death, or also conducting a complete series of optical observations, as Goethe carries out in his *Theory of Colors*. The goal is each time the same, namely to generate a continuous series of observations, which itself is an ongoing presentation of a whole and thereby can be viewed as a single experiment or phenomenon of a higher order.[30] In Kantian terms: it must first of all bring (discursively) a "whole" into view, from which an intuitive understanding can proceed synthetically to the parts.

The second demand, to take up the object in reflection and reproduce it in the mind, is not as easy to fulfill. Let us imagine that I want to draw a plant. First I sketch a stem, then add some leaves to the one side, then more leaves on the other side, and perhaps to finish I add to the whole a flower, whose petals I assemble in a kind of ring. I cannot draw the plant other than piece by piece and one after the other. Exactly in this way, it appears I cannot think its development other than discursively and successively, one piece after the other. But organisms do not develop in this way. They grow in all parts at the same time. If I want to grasp this conceptually, my thinking must be, as Goethe says, "as mobile and plastic as the example nature provides us." However, this can mean two different things.

First, I must not merely extend the length and add leaf upon leaf through successive additions; rather I must refer all the parts to each other continuously as they develop and grow apart from one another. To do this I must reflect on the formative force as it works *between* the individual parts (the leaves, etc.). As such, what are important are not

only the parts visible to the eye, but rather the *transitions* from shape to shape. These I can only experience through the observation of my own reproducing [*nachbildenden*] thinking. They are not immediately perceptible in given sensible intuitions. In a flowering plant, for instance, I must comprehend in thought the succession of expanding and contracting movements by means of which it completes its life cycle. Regarding this, Goethe writes:

> From seed to fullest development of stem leaves we noted first an expansion; thereupon we saw the calyx developing through contraction, the petals through expansion, and the sexual organs again through contraction; and soon we shall become aware of the maximum expansion in the fruit and the maximum concentration in the seed. In these six steps Nature ceaselessly carries on her eternal work of reproducing plants by means of two sexes.[31]

Second, this imaginatively reproducing thinking must be active in all parts of the plant at the same time. When, for example, the stem grows in height and new leaves emerge in its upper parts, the already existing leaves extend or metamorphose into new forms, and the roots penetrate deeper into the earth. The plant forms itself in all its parts at once. In order to comprehend this process, I must therefore also have in thought all its parts at once; in other words, the thought must become intuitive. The thought of a simultaneous whole of parts and that of a succession of alterations of parts must become an individual, living thought itself. Goethe was absolutely clear that such a connection between discursive and intuitive thinking is possible only as the result of effort and repeated practice:

> In all scientific research the difficulty of uniting idea and experience appears to be a great obstacle, for an idea is independent of time and place but research must be restricted within them. Therefore, in an idea, the simultaneous and successive are intimately bound up together, whereas in an experience they are always separated. Our attempt to imagine an operation of nature as both simultaneous and successive, as we must in an idea, seems to drive us to a form of madness.[32]

An apparent form of madness for Goethe, an antinomy for Kant! Indeed, both react in opposed ways. Since Kant only considers discursive thinking, organisms remain, in the end, ungraspable for him, the concept of a "natural purpose" remaining an internal contradiction for determinate judgment. As we have seen, he invalidates the 'antinomy' of judgment, by taking the idea and the investigation of nature, purposiveness and mechanism, simultaneity and succession, and dividing them into two maxims of reflective judgment, which as merely subjective principles are compatible with one another, but remain uncertain

with regard to the origins of products of nature. By contrast, Goethe remains entirely within the scope of what is objective. For him there is method to this "madness": Rightly understood, he is inviting us to develop an *extended*, not merely discursive, but rather equally intuitive form of thinking, which leads from the particular to the universal and from the universal to the particular, and that in the intuition of the whole turns into a higher form of experience, namely what Goethe variously called the "type" (*Typus*), the "concept" (*Begriff*), and the "idea" (*Idee*), and that is objectively realized in organisms. But this "idea" is not a conceptual abstraction from experience in Kant's sense, still less is it an "abstract idea" in the Lockean sense. On the contrary:[33] it is the concrete idea of a universal that manifests itself in innumerable spatiotemporal variations and formations, each of which represents the idea empirically, and hence imperfectly and in a limited manner.[34] It thereby comes about—to again summarize what was said—that (first) a complete series is generated by those successive phenomena or "shapes [*Gestalten*]" that can together represent the life cycle of an organism. The series must (secondly) be grasped as a whole, and the transitions between the parts, that is, their separate development, reproduced and "reflected" so that (thirdly) a "higher form of experience" can arise as a result—i.e., that all observed metamorphoses and appearances are of one and the same (ideal) organ, which under different empirical conditions can be presented in a variety of ways.

It may be clear that a valid judgment about the possibility or impossibility of such a process (and thus, about the possibility of an intuitive understanding) may not be reached without trying and understanding these steps. An exclusively discursive thinking, which because it knows no alternative believes it knows that there are none, thereby proves its philosophical naïveté. It thus dogmatically still falls short of the Kantian demand to at least attempt experimentally to think an alternative to our present cognitive capacities, to not maintain that our cognition is the only one possible.

4.

Thus, according to what has been sketched above, my argument in this paper is that, although Goethe's extension and appropriation of the third *Critique* has been until now almost completely ignored, it is in fact highly significant for the overcoming of Kant and the development of post-Kantian philosophy. For the moment, two things should be considered in this context. First is the way that Goethe connects up with Spinoza. As is well known, following the pantheism controversy begun by Jacobi, Spinoza became the author who could not be ignored if the

philosophical development initiated by Kant was to have a possible completion. But it is most worthy of consideration that the *Ethics*, which must be regarded as the sum of Spinoza's philosophical life's work, culminates in a species of cognition—namely, the third kind of knowing or *scientia intuitiva*—for which Spinoza could provide no examples other than mathematical ones. But what makes a mathematical proof a suitable example of the third kind of knowing for Spinoza? That it allows us to derive all the properties of its object from the object's essence. How does it do that? First, the sequence of steps of the proof must be completely laid out and run through. Secondly, they must be summarized as a whole, so that, thirdly, a new experience can arise from this whole, so that this one proof is valid in all cases (of the same kind).[35] Let us consider the example, mentioned by Spinoza himself, of the sum of the angles of a (Euclidean) triangle. If I draw a right triangle and add a line parallel to the hypotenuse running through the point opposite the hypotenuse, and then lengthen the remaining sides of the triangle (the legs) through that same point, there will emerge along this parallel (first) three angles which together add up to 180 degrees. But I do not end here; rather, I now grasp together in my mind all the steps that I had run through so that they form a whole, and thus I see (second) that the three angles of the triangle are repeated in these three new angles in the form of two corresponding angles and one vertical (opposite) angle, and thus the sum of the angles *in this triangle* also adds up to 180 degrees. But for these words to be a real proof, it is required (third) that a new insight, a new "higher form of experience," is employed, namely, that this is valid not only for *this* (right) triangle, but also for acute and obtuse triangles; in short, for *all* plane triangles. What must become clear is that the proof does not need to be repeated for other triangles. I 'see' in this both the particular and the universal at the same time; intuition and concept coincide.[36] For Spinoza, this represents an established ideal cognition of *scientia intuitiva*—however, he must admit, "the things I have so far been able to know by this kind of knowledge have been very few" (TIE 14). It seems that Goethe was the first overall to realize how such intuitive thinking could be systematically extended to non-mathematical objects, applying Spinoza's envisioned process of viewing universals in particulars to Kant's notion of natural purposes, thereby attempting to take a step beyond the Kantian limits.

Secondly, we should notice that, within the context of his numerous practical occupations in Jena, which in addition to a great number of experiments from 1803 included the supervision of all scientific institutes at the University of Jena, Goethe applied exactly the method we have been describing here. This was especially the case in the compil-

ing of encyclopedic collections of natural objects for the building of complete series of determined kinds and species, which was expected to make possible the intuition of a whole and thereby a "higher form of experience." Goethe himself had once expressed this in the following way:

> When I see before me something which has already taken shape, inquire about its origins and trace back the process as far as I can follow, I become aware of a series of stages. Naturally, these cannot be observed side by side with the physical eye but must be pictured mentally as a certain ideal whole. Inclined at first to postulate certain stages, I am finally compelled, since nature does not make leaps, to regard the sequence of uninterrupted activity as a whole, annulling individual details so as not to destroy the total impression.[37]

On the basis of botanical cabinets, facilities, and collections, those of Goethe's contemporaries who were interested could receive, on the spot as it were, concretely displayed in "hands-on exhibitions,"[38] the practical training of an intuitive understanding in Kant's sense, with the development of a *scientia intuitiva* in the sense of Spinoza's third kind of knowing. In this way, they could see with Goethe, in a partially realized way, what they themselves had in mind as an ideal of cognition.

The question remains, however, how far and to what extent the post-Kantian idealists were actually influenced by Goethe in the formation of their own philosophical methodologies. This would have to be considered for each thinker individually. For Fichte, I have tried to show elsewhere some points of connection.[39] For Schelling, we can testify to the experiments on color jointly conducted with Goethe as well as a large number of conversations, although I also think that, apart from this, Goethe's influence on Schelling's *philosophical* development should be viewed as rather minor. The case seems to me to be entirely different with Hegel. With him I believe I can show that it was the direct confrontation with Goethe's work, mediated through his friend Schelver, who from 1803 was commissioned in Jena as a professor of botany and as the director of the botanical gardens with the collections and cabinets acquired by Goethe's method, that led to the decisive reason for his break with Schelling and to a conceptual shift and philosophical re-orientation around 1803–1804. But I cannot provide the proof for this claim here. It will be the topic of the second part of this essay.

Translated by Matthew Congdon and Karen Ng

NOTES

I would like to thank Johannes Haag and Holger Sturm for numerous critical comments on an earlier version of this text.

1. Goethe did not specify section numbers, as he evidently wrote this from memory and did not recall the exact numbering. That it must have concerned §§76 and 77 of the *Critique of Judgment* is evidenced by the next sentence as well as by the longer quotation that I quote below at the beginning of §2 of this paper. The editions of Goethe that contain this fragment limit themselves to mere guesswork as to which sections could be meant due to a lack of a genuine philosophical understanding of Kant's text: thus, it is listed as §64 of the *Critique of Judgment* in Goethe's *Schriften zur Morphologie*, vol. 24 of *Sämtliche Werke, Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche*, ed. Dorothea Kuhn, Deutscher Klassiker Verlag (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), p. 155; §82 in pt. 2 of vol. 17 of his *Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften*, in *Gedenkausgabe der Werke: Briefe und Gespräche*, ed. Ernst Beutler (Zurich: Artemis, 1952), p. 61; §64 in *Zur Morphologie*, vol. 9A, pt. 2, of *Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, ed. Dorothea Kuhn (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1947–), p. 552; §61 in *Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, ed. Michael Böhler (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1927), p. 118; §64 in pt. 2 of vol. 3 of *Italien und Weimar 1786–1790*, in *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens*, ed. Hans-Georg Dewitz, Norbert Miller, Gerhard H. Müller, John Neubauer, Hartmut Reinhardt, Irmtraut Schmid, and Hans J. Becker (Leipzig: Carl Hanser, 1990), p. 626; and §63 in *Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften*, ed. Rudolf Steiner, vol. 117 of *Deutsche National-Literatur*, ed. Joseph Kürchner (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1883–97), p. 550.

2. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Metamorphose der Pflanzen: Zweiter Versuch*, in vol. 10, pt. 1, of *Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, pp. 66ff.

3. Later in his life, Goethe wrote: "It is an unbounded service of our old Kant to the world, and I may add to myself, that in his *Critique of Judgment* he effectively placed art and nature side by side, and granted both the right of acting in accordance with great principles without purpose" (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe to Friedrich Karl Zelter, 29 January 1830, in vol. 4 of *Werke*, ed. Erich Trunz [Munich: C.H. Beck, 1981], p. 370).

4. F.W.J. Schelling, *Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen*, in vol. 2 of *Werke*, ed. Hans Michael Baumgartner, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Hermann Krings (Stuttgart: Fromman-Holzboog, 1976–), p. 175; see also p. 162; *Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge*, in *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794–1796)*, trans. Fritz Marti (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1980).

5. F.W.J. Schelling to J.G. Fichte, 3 October 1801, in vol. 5, pt. 3, of J.G. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Erich Fuchs, Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacobs, and Hans Gliwitzky (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1964–), pp. 80–1.

6. G.W.F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, trans. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), p. 92.

7. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p. 401; henceforth CJ, followed by page number.

8. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Bedford, 1969), A575f.; henceforth CPR, followed by page number of the Akademie edition.

9. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, "Über die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn," in vol. 1 of *Werke*, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998).

10. See also Dieter Henrich, *Der Grund im Bewusstsein* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), pp. 48ff.

11. Hegel writes in *Faith and Knowledge*: "Yet he himself [Kant] thinks an intuitive intellect and is led to it as an absolutely necessary Idea. So it is he himself who establishes the opposite experience, [the experience] of thinking a non-discursive intellect. He himself shows that his cognitive faculty is aware not only of the appearance and of the separation of the possible and the actual in it, but also of Reason and of the In-itself" (Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 89). And Schelling writes correspondingly: "At least indirectly, he [Kant] has prepared and introduced the idea of a truly infinite cognition limited by no opposite, no more sensible than supersensible" (F.W.J. Schelling to G.W.F. Hegel, 1 July 1796, in vol. 1 of *Aus Schellings Leben: In Briefen*, ed. Gustav Leopold Plitt [Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1869], p. 151).

12. Initially Kant had also not clearly distinguished both capacities, i.e., until the problem of organisms made necessary the thought of an alternative *understanding* (for example at CPR B135). A clear distinction begins to be apparent for the first time in the passages in question in the *Critique of Judgment*, esp. CJ 405.

13. CPR B135; B138f.; B145; B149; B153; and B159.

14. Such an intuition, "which is the ground and not the consequence of the object, is, since it is independent, original intuition and therefore completely intellectual" (Immanuel Kant, *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*, in vol. 2 of *Werke*, ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–], §10, p. 397; cf. CPR B159, etc.).

15. In the "Prize Essay on the Progress of Metaphysics," such an intuition in opposition to that of our own is described simply as an "immediate (direct) mode of presentation of an object," which is not attached to something sensibly conditioned (Immanuel Kant, *Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolff's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?* in vol. 20 of *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902–), p. 267. Since Kant defines sensibility as a receptive or passive capacity, the visual-ray theories of vision of Plato (*Timeaus*, 45Bf., 64D, 67Cf.), Sophocles (*Ajax*, l. 69), Euclid (*Optics*) and other authors of antiquity are examples of (in the Kantian sense, non-sensible) intuition, which perceives things in themselves without producing them. On ancient theories

of sight, see Gérard Simon, *Le regard, l'être et l'apparence dans l'optique de l'antiquité* (Paris: Seuil, 1988); and David C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

16. The universal and the whole, as well as particular and part, are not strictly speaking identical, which presents a problem of its own that I can overlook in the present context.

17. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Intuitive Judgment," in *Goethe's Botanical Writings*, trans. Bertha Mueller (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1989), pp. 232–3; trans. mod.

18. Cf. Henrich, *Der Grund im Bewusstsein*.

19. [Plants and stones.—Trans.]

20. [Individual objects.—Trans.]

21. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Briefe*, ed. Karl Robert Mandelkow (Munich: Beck, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 475–6.

22. Ibid., pp. 508f.

23. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Italienische Reise*, in vol. 11 of *Werke*, p. 395.

24. Immanuel Kant, *Jäsche Logik*, in vol. 9 of *Gesammelte Schriften*, p. 91.

25. Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, in vol. 28 of *Werke*, pp. 780f.

26. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Considerable Assistance from One Ingeniously Chosen Word," in *Goethe's Botanical Writings*, p. 235; trans. mod.

27. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Formation and Transformation," in *Goethe's Botanical Writings*, p. 24; trans. mod.

28. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Polarity," in *Scientific Studies*, trans. and ed. Douglas Miller (New York: Suhrkamp Publishers New York, 1988), p. 155; trans. mod.

29. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "The Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject," in *Scientific Studies*, pp. 11–7.

30. "Such a piece of empirical evidence, composed of many others, is clearly of a higher sort. It shows the general formula, so to speak, that overarches an array of individual arithmetic sums. In my view, it is the task of the scientific researcher to work toward empirical evidence of this higher sort" (ibid., p. 16).

31. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "The Metamorphoses of Plants," in *Goethe's Botanical Writings*, §73, pp. 60–1.

32. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Indecision and Surrender," in *Goethe's Botanical Writings*, p. 219; trans. mod.

33. For Goethe, the universal is not an abstraction, but the particular, the singular shape [*Gestalt*]. In the scientist's use of the expression *Gestalt*,

"the element of mutability is left out of consideration: it is assumed that whatever forms a composite whole is made fast, is cut off, and is fixed in its character. However, when we study forms, the organic ones in particular, nowhere do we find permanence, repose, or termination. We find rather that everything is in ceaseless flux" (Goethe, "Formation and Transformation," in *Goethe's Botanical Writings*, p. 23).

34. "The universal and the particular coincide; the particular is the universal appearing under different conditions" (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Maxims and Reflections*, trans. Elisabeth Stopp [New York: Penguin: 1998], §569, p. 76; trans. mod.).

35. That this is not today's usual deductive notion of a proof as the derivation of propositions from axioms can remain unconsidered here. On contemporary problematics and the relationship between explanation and proof in recent philosophy of mathematics, see, for instance, Paolo Mancosu, "Mathematical Explanation: Problems and Perspectives," *Topoi* 20:1 (2001), pp. 97–117.

36. What exactly does "seeing" consist in here? In the observation of one's own thinking. As soon as I modify the triangle in thought, it becomes clear that all variations simply result in a shift in location of the lengthened sides in relation to the parallel, and thus the modifications can only be within the 180 degrees of the angles. The sum of the angles in the triangle therefore also remains unchanged.

37. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Preliminary Notes for a Physiology of Plants," in *Goethe's Botanical Writings*, p. 93; trans. mod.

38. [English in original—Trans.]

39. See my "'Da geht der Mann dem wir alles verdanken!' Eine Untersuchung zum Verhältnis Goethe-Fichte," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 45:3 (1997), pp. 331–44.

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The Significance of §§76 and 77 Of the *Critique of Judgment* for the Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy (Part 2)

Eckart Förster

> For when I look back over the course of my intellectual development, I see you everywhere woven into it, and may call myself one of your sons: what is inward in me has been nourished by you [in its growth] toward resilient strength in the face of abstraction, and has oriented its course by your forms as by beacons.
> —Hegel to Goethe, April 24, 1825[1]

In Part 1 of this essay[2] we saw that in sections 76 and 77 of the *Critique of Judgment* intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding are thematized as two distinct cognitive powers irreducible to one another. Furthermore, according to Kant, they are cognitive powers that we must conceive in order to maintain the possibility of a mode of cognition other than our own, even though this possibility cannot be truly known since these modes of cognition lie beyond our cognitive limits. We also saw however, that in the immediate aftermath of Kant, attempts were made to exceed both limits: whereas, apart from Fichte, Schelling above all made intellectual intuition the foundation of his philosophy, Goethe developed a methodology of intuitive understanding, which he used especially in his work on natural philosophy. The following essay aims to demonstrate the significance of intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding for Hegel's philosophical development.

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1.

In his first Jena publication, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* of 1801, Hegel describes the task of philosophy as the overcoming of the finitude of consciousness and the construction of the absolute in consciousness. Accordingly he criticized Fichte for falling prey to this, and, in the course of building his system, for having "degraded" the speculative principle of his beginning—the identity of subject and object in the form of I=I—to a chain of finitudes of consciousness from which the one identity and true infinity that genuinely comprises speculative knowing cannot be regained: "The principle, the Subject-Object, turns out to be a subjective Subject-Object."[3] Against this, Hegel maintains the possibility of knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] of the absolute in which reflection and intuition are united such that neither subjective nor objective identity predominates. Stated more exactly, this knowledge persists in its negative function as bare reflection in the demonstration of the identity of opposites, in antinomies, and therefore in the overcoming of the merely finite knowledge of the understanding [*Verstandeserkenntnis*]. In its positive function it is intellectual or "transcendental" intuition, which guarantees the actuality of the aforementioned unity, and prevents that reflection disperses in an endless series of finitudes. Ultimately, all subjective elements of intuition, and thus intuiting itself, should be abstracted from; thus Hegel can say: "Transcendental knowledge unites both reflection and intuition. It is *at once concept and being*."[4]

It is not difficult to see that behind this critique of Fichte lies a model of absolute knowing, which is oriented to §76 of the *Critique of Judgment* with Kant's idea of an original basis [*Urgrund*] (as intellectual or rational intuition), in which being and thought, the subjective and the objective coincide. Here Schelling's influence is obvious, for in the last works of Hegel's Frankfurt period, as far as these are known to us, the absolute is still comprehended as life, and a "transcendental" or intellectual intuition of subject-object plays no role at all. Schelling, however, had already been committed to the methodological ideal of that thought since his early work, *Of the I as Principle of Philosophy*, which Kant had brought into play in the aforementioned §76—although only with a critical intention—and that Schelling immediately turned into something positive. This idea becomes especially clear in Schelling's first writing on the philosophy of identity, the *Presentation of My System of Philosophy*, which appeared in May 1801 in Schelling's *Zeitschrift für spekulative Philosophie* and to which Hegel oriented himself in the *Differenzschrift*. In the *Presentation*, Schelling holds what he calls the "point of indifference" [*Indifferenzpunct*] between transcen-

dental and natural philosophy, or the standpoint of absolute reason, insofar as it is thought as the complete identity of the subjective and the objective:

> Expressed in the clearest way possible, our assertion is this: if we could view everything that *is* in the totality, we would perceive in the whole a perfect quantitative balance of subjectivity and objectivity, hence nothing else than a pure identity in which nothing is distinguishable, however much in the perspective of the individual a preponderance might occur on one side or the other. We would therefore perceive that even this quantitative difference is in no way posited *in itself*, but only in appearance. . . . This identity, however, is not produced, but original identity, and it is only produced because it *is*.[5]

Moreover, in his correspondence with Fichte during this period Schelling again explains the idea of the absolute—as something whose intuition is in thinking and whose thinking is in intuition—through explicit reference to §76 of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*.[6]

2.

During the brief two and a half years that Schelling and Hegel spent together in Jena, they not only lived together temporarily under one roof, but they also worked together philosophically. Above all, they were together responsible for the publication of the *Kritischen Journal der Philosophie* of which they were the sole authors, never signing their individual contributions, and thereby creating the unavoidable impression of extensive philosophical agreement, just as intended.

Starting in 1803–1804, a significant distance grew between Hegel and Schelling as Schelling left Jena in May 1803 to accept a position in Würzburg. With the publication of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in 1807, the previously friendly relationship came to a complete standstill: after a brief exchange of letters in which Schelling could hardly hold back his displeasure over the critique of him formulated in the *Phenomenology*, contact between the former friends broke off for good.[7] Likewise, during the time of their emerging estrangement, a fundamental change took place in Hegel's position, the final reasons for which are still unsolved today. There is a consensus in Hegel scholarship that, from 1803–1804, a fundamentally new orientation of the Hegelian conception of system began, which brought along with it a more or less vague concept of spirit, without being able to bring that actual connection satisfactorily to light. The currently known reasons for Hegel's philosophical development during his Jena years, which I will not place into question, but that also cannot be closely examined

here,[8] are not sufficient for an actual understanding of this transformation in thought. So it remains for the most part in the dark why, for example, after 1804 the part of the system called "Logic and Metaphysics" was given up and metaphysics itself turned into logic, which must now indeed be preceded by a (never before mentioned) "Phenomenology of Spirit."[9]

In the following I would like to defend the thesis that it was in no small part the beginning of Hegel's 1803 confrontation with Goethe's concept of science, suggested to him by his friend Schelver, that had a considerable yet until now overlooked impact on the transformation of Hegel's Jena conception of system. Briefly stated (and in an overly simplified manner), according to my view, in the years 1803–1804 a shift took place in Hegel's own conception of philosophy from a Schellingian to a Goethean interpretation of the intuitive understanding in the sense of the *Critique of Judgment*: from a ground, or rather an intuition, in which concept and being, possibility and actuality coincide, to a reason which moves from the synthetic universal to the particular, and thereby to another concept (of knowledge) of the absolute.

Accordingly, I maintain that until 1803 Hegel had, with regard to the absolute, oriented himself exactly as did Schelling to the basic ideas of §76 of the *Critique of Judgment*, and as such identified intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding, or rather, did not differentiate between them. The essential difference between §§76 and 77, and thus the difference between that which according to Kant indicates two distinct limits of human cognitive powers, was overlooked by both thinkers equally. Hence Hegel had, for example, in *Faith and Knowledge* (as he also had in the earlier *Differenzschrift*), completely collapsed intuitive understanding in Schelling's sense with intellectual intuition, and had interpreted them Spinozistically as *causa sui*, "in which concept and intuition, possibility and actuality, are one."[10] In accordance with Kant's explanation of intuitive understanding as a synthetically universal understanding that does not proceed discursively from parts to whole, but rather determines the parts according to the whole as the "infinite, in which nothing is negated and determined,"[11] Hegel had also misunderstood and therefore missed the actual point of the Kantian distinction between intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding. At this period in his thinking, Hegel does not yet appear to have heard of an interpretation of the latter, precisely, not in terms of a Spinozistic *causa sui*, but rather in the sense of a *scientia intuitiva*. The fourth section of this essay explores the extent to which this was changed by Hegel's confrontation with Goethe.

First, I must provide some little known historical and biographical information relating to Hegel and his friend Schelver and their activities during their shared time in Jena. The following third section of my essay must therefore proceed purely historically; I cannot return to systematic considerations until section four.

3.

I begin with Schelver:[12] Franz Joseph Schelver, born July 24, 1778(9?) in Osnabruck, matriculated on April 20th, 1796 at the University of Jena as a student of medicine, though he also attended lectures in many different subject areas. As such, he studied, among other things, botany under Batsch (who founded the botanical garden with Goethe in 1794), as well as philosophy under Fichte, attending courses on his *Wissenschaftslehre*, logic and metaphysics, ethics, and natural right.[13] It was at this time that Fichte first presented his *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo*, as well as published the first and second introductions to the *Wissenschaftslehre*. In the fall of 1797, Schelver transferred to Göttingen, where he graduated one year later with his inaugural dissertation, *De irritabilitate*.

From 1801 to 1803, Schelver was a *Privatdozent* in Halle. There, from 1802, he also held lectures on *Naturphilosophie* that he tried to associate wholly with Schelling.[14] In the same year, he published the *Zeitschrift für organische Physik* for which he was the sole writer and of which only two issues appeared.[15] It is through these developments that Schelver introduced himself to the wider public.

With the aid of this publication, we can try to develop a picture of Schelver's intellectual profile directly before his call to Jena. To current readers, there is a very clear discrepancy between the claim of the preface (in the sense of Fichte's transcendental philosophy) and the claim of the resultant text, which, on the face of it, applies to its subject matters the Schellingian schema of identity philosophy as it is found above all in his *Presentation of My System of Philosophy*.

In the preface, Schelver demands of his readers that they possess inner life, since only the living mind [*Geist*] can conceive the infinite spirit [*Geist*] of life. Clearly referring to Fichte's "Second Introduction to the *Wissenschaftslehre*," Schelver writes: "Finally transform the fact [*Tatsache*] into an act and bring it to life. Only when you give birth to the act and watch this development do you gain *insight* [*Einsicht*]. But whoever sets the act into becoming, which rises up in creation, does so only through the living force of spirit [*die lebendige Kraft des Geistes*]."[16] In the execution, he advances in the same manner as Schelling: for all factors of a species he finds the common point of indifference in order to

construe the organic developments [N.B. something other than what is "moved in(to) becoming"]. This should take place by tracing out the proper poles or extremes through the various stages to a corresponding point of indifference:

> It can thus develop the factors of the species only to the extreme of the mutual point of indifference. Beyond this stage nothing can enter the individual; it is the limit of their progression. Thus, the species [*Gattung*] exists through the genera [*Geschlechter*]; the point of indifference is given through the poles, and vice versa. Thus every organization is in a closed world and a member of a higher order; so no point of indifference is absolute, and the universe *ad infinitum* is infinite activity in rest.[17]

In this sense, the separation of the sexes, the nervous and skeletal systems, the muscular and circulatory systems, the digestive system with reference to sickness and healing and so forth, are each construed according to the same external schema.

The same assimilation of the Schellingian principle of construction also marks Schelver's reviews of two texts by the physician Andreas Röschlaub of Bamberg in the year 1802. There he says, among other things, that these texts were widely untouched by the "infinite spirit of Schellingian creations" and that the author only half understood the philosophy of nature. Thus, only when the "all-ruling crown of speculative physics" reached its peak would a true "construction of diseases" succeed.[18]

Schelling himself was not an uncritical supporter of Schelver. In a letter to the editor of the *Erlanger Literatur-Zeitung*, G.E.A. Mehmel, dated March 1st, 1802, Schelling writes, for example, that although Schelver indeed passes himself off as a complete authority on Schellingian philosophy of nature, he still lacks a true understanding of the topic.[19] Nevertheless, Schelling spoke to Goethe on Schelver's behalf in support of his appointment and, after Batsch's death in 1802, Schelver filled the chair in botany at Jena.[20]

This chair, the appointing of which Goethe (together with Voigt) was first and foremost responsible, is of considerable significance in connection with my thesis concerning the transformation of Hegel's thought during his Jena years. As already mentioned, Goethe and the Jena Professor A.J.G.K. Batsch had founded a botanical garden in 1794, with its own institute in the prince's garden. In the course of this and at the same time—and indeed, against the wishes of the medical faculty—Goethe also forced through and advanced botany from a "helping science" of medicine to an independent and separate discipline at the university whose professor from then on also belonged to the philosophy faculty. From the perspective of university politics, an important

step was made thereby for the scientific establishment of Goethean morphology, or rather, the theory of metamorphosis. Consequently, neither medical nor economic aims would determine the construction of the garden; rather, solely morphological-systematic aims should be considered:

> The goal of a botanical garden is to possess as many different species of plants of all genera as possible, so that they both appear well planted and can also be made as useful as possible for the study of botany. Hence, a skilled botanical gardener will also grow them [the plants], where they stand not on their conveniently favorable soil, but rather, where they *must* stand due to a systematic ordering.[21]

However, very soon after and with great disappointment, Goethe must have noticed that Batsch took very little note of Goethean methodology in his publications.[22]

As Schelver succeeded Batsch in 1803 and thereby also took over the management of the botanical garden, Goethe made sure to incorporate an extra clause in Schelver's contract that stated that the "construction of the garden, the order of the beds, etc." were not allowed to change and, "on the contrary, everything in the established order must be unchanged."[23] Goethe himself insisted that he would personally introduce Schelver to the daily activities of the garden and advised him on the use of the garden for his botanical lectures. In addition and above all, Schelver was also assigned the task of compiling the various new collections and cabinets in a "small botanical museum."[24] Hegel, who had already closely befriended Schelver by this time and had taken a keen interest in his activities at the garden,[25] wrote to Schelling on November 16th, 1803: "Goethe is really going for the real thing, instruments and all. He not only prompted Schelver to set up a botanical cabinet, but a physiological one is also being built."[26]

From this context it becomes perhaps understandable that in a very short time a scientific change took place in Schelver's thinking, from a conception initially opposed to Goethe's morphological thinking to a fundamental appropriation of his methodology. Schelver had initially still held that the *Metamorphosis of Plants* was not speculative enough and had criticized, in comparison with Schelling, that it was content "with the worst empirical necessity," and that it was "a highly vulgar abstraction";[27] thus it especially appears to have been the practical tasks under Goethe's intensive and personal instructions that led Schelver to an unexpectedly quick change of heart.

After a visit by Schelver and Hegel on November 27th, 1803, Goethe writes to Schiller that same evening: "I spent some quite pleasant hours with Schelver, Hegel, and Fernow. The first [Schelver] works so

beautifully in the botanical discipline according to *what I hold to be right*, that I hardly trust my eyes and ears."[28] However, Schelver's lecture announcements also allow us to see that he increasingly appropriated Goethe's method and what he held "to be right": during the summer semester of 1803, his first semester in Jena, he still simply announced his lecture as "botany," but beginning in the following year, he lectured on "botany in connection with botanical excursions," or rather, "with the use of the ducal botanical garden."[29] As Schelver reported to Schelling in the summer of that year, Goethe also "took special care" concerning his lectures.[30]

Goethe, with justification, was thus also in favor of the extension of Shelver's contract in 1805, claiming that "it was extremely desirable that this young, highly learned man who is becoming more and more well-trained in his endeavors is being retained."[31] However, after the devastating defeat of the Prussian army in the Battle of Jena on October 14th, 1806, Shelver was completely raided by the Napoleonic troops and his natural cabinets were totally destroyed. As a result, he hurriedly left Jena and finally accepted a chair at Heidelberg.[32]

It seems to me decisive that in these three years Goethe taught Schelver to interpret botany entirely in his own sense.[33] We can also see what importance Schelver himself attached to his apprenticeship with Goethe, when sixteen years after his flight from Jena, in a book dedicated to Goethe, he writes of "those unforgettable days, in your profound collections and under your attentive leadership, which awoke in me the eye of the soul," and hopes that this dedicated work "becomes a small token of appreciation for those free and cheerful exhibitions in which, through you, I was first christened."[34] Goethe also never lost his high estimation of Schelver; even twenty years later he spoke of him with good will, as someone who earned various merits in the natural sciences.[35]

Hegel: As already mentioned, Hegel took an active interest in the scientific activities of his friend. Clearly, he himself also became active in the botanical garden. His biographer Rosenkranz reports on the joint botanical efforts of both friends, but also on the fact that Hegel, for example, independently reproduced experiments from Goethe's theory of colors.[36] Above all, through Schelver, Hegel became more closely acquainted with Goethe. Occasionally, they were invited to Goethe's house in Weimar together, and Goethe contemplated a remedy that could cure Hegel's weaknesses in verbal expression. Of his scientific talents, however, Goethe appeared to have been particularly and immediately deeply impressed. He wrote to Schiller already in November 1803 that Hegel was "an excellent man,"[37] and his colleague Voigt reports in a letter to Frankenberg on July 2nd, 1804: "Goethe cannot

say enough good things about him [Hegel]."[38] The Jena theology professor Paulus, whose edition of Spinoza Hegel briefly worked on, also reports: "With respect to background knowledge of mathematics and physics, Goethe thought more highly of Hegel than of Schelling, as he said to me several times."[39]

In the summer of 1804, in addition to preparations for his lectures, Hegel was already busy with the aforementioned new conception of his philosophy, which he hoped to be able to present to Goethe and with which he had also associated the hope of a promotion. To this end, he wrote to Goethe on September 29th, 1804: "So far my literary works are too insignificant for me to dare present them to Your Excellency. The purpose of a work I hope to complete this winter for my lectures—a purely scientific elaboration of philosophy—will permit me to present it to Your Excellency, should I be kindly permitted to do so."[40] That the "scientific elaboration of philosophy" concerns the text, "Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie," of 1804–1805, preserved as a fragment and on which Hegel must have placed his hopes for being able to fulfill Goethe's scientific criteria, is now considered almost certain.[41] However, Hegel never presented it to Goethe, and instead work on this text suddenly stopped altogether. The precise reason for this will occupy us later.

After further delays and restructurings, when Hegel was finally able to set the publication of the *Phenomenology* in motion, Goethe wrote to Karl Ludwig von Knebel: "It gives me great pleasure to hear that Hegel went to Bamberg in order to solicit a publisher for his work. I expect finally to see a presentation of his way of thinking. His is a splendid mind, and one that is very difficult for him to communicate!"[42]

However, it seems to me that more important than Goethe's assessment of Hegel's talents is Hegel's own opinion of his familiarity with Goethe's thinking and scientific methodology. Hence, it is worthy of special attention in the present connection that, shortly after Schelver's flight from Jena, Hegel offered to take over his friend's academic responsibilities. Hegel's hopes were stirred that a part of Schelver's unused salary could be used to improve his own income. Hegel felt however that he was also absolutely qualified for such a task: "Given the resources available in the Botanical Garden—along with Your Excellency's support, should I be able to count on it—I could soon deliver botanical lectures as well as ones on philosophy."[43] After what has been said, it goes without saying that Hegel must have understood himself to be able to conduct this task in the mode of Goethe's morphology.

Goethe did not agree to this proposal; he had already appointed another successor for Schelver's chair. His high estimation of Hegel

however, remained unaffected. As von Knebel disclosed soon after, Goethe in fact expressed to him the opposite conviction, that Hegel, Schelver, and (the physicist/chemist) Thomas Johann Seebeck could "alone make up an entire Academy."[44]

4.

After these purely historical considerations, the question arises: What new thing in particular may Schelver have learned under Goethe's instruction that turned his view away from his original, Schelling-inspired philosophy of nature and allowed him to become a Goethean? And was Hegel, through his attention to this, able to draw any consequences for his own philosophy? For the aforementioned change in Hegel's conception of philosophy occurred precisely in the early stages of his friendship with Schelver, as did the clear yet unexpectedly abrupt break with Schelling. Thus Hegel notes in his "Jena Notebook" (the "Wastebook") at this time: "What Schellingian Philosophy is in its essence the near future will reveal. The court that will pass judgment upon it stands at the door"; and "*Philosophy of Nature*: Some time will still have to pass before it proceeds entirely without fibs" (GW 5, 494; GW 5, 503).

In order to answer these questions, at least to a certain extent, I would like to return to the metamorphosis of plants. This is naturally only an example of what Goethe had in mind under a more general scientific procedure, a *scientia intuitiva*. He wrote from Italy that he wanted to expand the method to other fields, and his efforts to shape the management of all of the Jena natural science institutes according to his thinking is indirect but eloquent testimony of his intention. That this is an example should once again be explicitly stressed; for Hegel—as we shall see—naturally did not move in the direction of the metamorphosis of plants as such, but rather toward the methodology of the intuitive understanding developed therein. However, since the theory of metamorphosis doubtlessly plays the most important role in connection with Schelver and Hegel, it will thus serve here as our example for the sake of approaching our question, how both friends could have reacted to it. What, then, can we learn from the theory of the metamorphosis of plants? In the present context, there are two main points of interest.

First: One can describe the outcome of Goethe's metamorphosis of plants conceptually as a threefold alternation of expansion and contraction, in which a selfsame idea, an identical organ, presents itself in various shapes of organization according to environmental conditions.[45] While this outcome can be discursively expressed, however, as I

attempted to show in part 1 of this paper,[46] it cannot be obtained in a discursive fashion, but rather only by means of an understanding that has become intuitive. For, according to Goethe, I can only know this, or rather, whether this is the case and what it concretely means if I: (1) have produced a complete series of those successive forms, which together make up the life cycle of a flowering plant; and (2) have made the concept "fluid" and thought intuitive in this series of forms, thereby allowing the *transitions* between the parts, that is, the forms in the succession, to be passable. If I mentally comprehend these transitions, which are all movements of expansion and contraction, then (3) it becomes clear that it is always the same "idea," the same "organ," that here (and in the case of all flowering plants) goes through metamorphosis, organized in six stages.[47]

From this it follows, *second*, that the idea cannot underlie or direct this examination. The grasping of the complete series of forms as an organic unity necessarily precedes knowledge of the idea; only then can the idea be expressed independently of these forms. This is why Goethe speaks of the transformation of one form into another as an "imaginary ladder" [*geistigen Leiter*] (M 6), which the scientist must climb if he is to know the idea that forms the basis of the metamorphosis.

Significantly, Schelling also repeatedly characterized his identity philosophy—particularly in the *Presentation of My System of Philosophy*—with the help of the concept of metamorphosis, which he believed to have gained from Goethe,[48] and it is revealing to compare his interpretation with what has been said up to now. He sees in the metamorphosis of plants the fundamental schema not only of all plant organisms, but also of chemical processes (§126 Z2);[49] the formation of planetary systems (§95 Z2); the universe (§95; cf. SW 2, 125); and his own theory of the potencies (§95 Z5; cf. §126 Z2). In other words, Schelling understood his own whole identity philosophy as a theory of metamorphosis. Because he took from Goethe's theory as his own fundamental schema simply the *alternation* of expansion and contraction (§78; cf. SW 2, 172; and SW 2, 125)—there is namely only "an attractive and expansive force in the whole, which is more or less accumulated in opposing directions" (§95 Z5)—and because identity philosophy denies a creation in the original sense (§§13, 14, 126 Z2), Schelling's concept of metamorphosis is that of a timeless differentiation of original identity, which is construed through its ongoing potentializing [*Potenzierung*]:

> We can thus express ourselves on the relationship of the original metamorphosis (§95), which we named second and that is posited through the dynamical, although at first chemical process, with more certainty than we have until now: The original metamorphosis indicates the gradual settling of gravity as the mere form of

> being [*Seyns*] of absolute identity; absolute identity is only within the one sphere of *light* (A2), within which gravity is posited as gravity, not as mere potency [*Potenz*]; rather, it is itself the immediate cause [*Ursache*] of that first metamorphosis, or the immediate positing [*Setzende*] of that first series in which all original materials fall. As opposed to this, the immediate cause [*Ursache*] of the second metamorphosis is gravity, which, because it is torn out of its rest by that first metamorphosis, through magnetics, through electricity, tries to sublate [*aufzuheben*] the totality by a chemical process of the potencies under which it is first posited. (§139 Z)

Organic nature ultimately is "itself nothing other than the power [*Potenz*] to hear recurrent nature" (SW 2, 681) whereby reproduction, irritability, and sensibility represent the three potencies of natural processes.

One may say that this view misses what is essential in Goethe's theory of metamorphosis. Schelling was indeed familiar with the book, but had certainly not studied intuitive thought on the basis of the complete series of forms, as Schelver—and thereby also, indirectly, Hegel—must have done under the instruction of Goethe and as was necessary, if the underlying method was to be applied to other fields. The critique of Schelling's methodology that Hegel formulated at the end of his time at Jena in the preface to the *Phenomenology* suddenly becomes, with this background in mind, understandable even in its choice of words. Looked at more closely, Schelling's methodology is simply

> the *formless* repetition of one and the same thing, only *externally* applied to diverse materials.[50]

> Instead of the *inner life* and *self-movement* of its existence, this kind of simple determinateness of intuition—which means here sense-knowledge—is predicated in accordance with a superficial analogy, and this external, empty application of the formula is called a *'construction'*. . . . Even when the specific determinateness—say one like magnetism, for example—is in itself concrete or real, the understanding degrades it into something lifeless, merely predicating it of another existent thing, rather than cognizing it as the immanent life of the thing.[51]

> Scientific cognition, on the contrary, demands surrender to the life of the object.[52]

Now, it should be seen that Hegel's reproach here of Schelling is, *mutatis mutandis*, also appropriately directed at his own early Jena formulation. In the *Differenzschrift*, for example, the absolute is indeed construed in consciousness, such that antinomies are generated for each finitude of reflection through a repeated positing of the opposing determination, thereby showing the identity of the opposites. Thus, we

have here as well a purely external application of one and the same schema. And in the 1802 essay on skepticism Hegel says, along the same lines, that "science is, with respect to its content, an embodiment of that rational identity, and on its formal side a continual repetition of the same. . . . The science of philosophy, too, only repeats forever one and the same rational identity."[53]

What Hegel set himself against after 1803 is what he had referred to as, in the critique of Schelling just cited, the "inner life" and "self-movement" of existence [*Dasein*]. What attests to this above all is the 1804–1805 text, "Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie,"[54] which Hegel wanted to present to Goethe. Here it is shown, for the first time, that instead of an external generation of identities, the categories of reflection move *of themselves* toward a totality. The real theme and what is actually new in the part of this text devoted to logic, as opposed to Hegel's early conception of logic, is consequently the concentration on the *transitions* between determinations of thought.

Significantly, the text also establishes a critique of Schelling (although he is not mentioned by name), when Hegel speaks of the "so-called construction of the idea out of the opposed activities of the ideal and the real," which has, "as the unity of both, produced nothing but the limit."[55] That is to say, the two activities are not actually united with one another in the construction; they remain external to one another, or rather, only meet tangentially, such that between them a limit remains as something itself, a determinate third thing. In contrast with this, Hegel shows, beginning with the category of quality, that "limit" is in actuality the dialectical unity of reality and negation, which arises as soon as one thinks through the concept of quality as that which is "only equal to itself, without respect to an other." For each such simple determinacy, because of its determinacy, necessarily excludes an indeterminate multiplicity of determinacies to and through which, however, it also refers only negatively. That every quality has a relation to something else that is simultaneously negated and excluded, is, according to Hegel, the true concept of limit.

> In the limit, quality becomes what it is according to its absolute essence, what according to its concept (posited essence), however, it is not to be, and into which at the same time its concept must pass, in that the latter is posited as what it is to be; the limit is thereby the totality or true reality, which [when] compared with its concept, contains its dialectic as well, because the concept sublates itself therein in such a manner that it has become its own contrary.[56]

The concept of the limit is that into which the concept of quality must pass over, so it is again true of the limit that it is determined entirely through the limiting of another, although this is likewise

excluded, that is, it is something determinate and yet also not determinate. This according to Hegel is at the same time the essence of *quantity*, namely to be a being in which the multiplicity of determinacies is indifferently excluded. As such, he can claim that the essence of quality, the limit, is quantity. The one concept thus passes over into the other, and this is now according to Hegel the case for all categories of logic, which he tries to develop in this manuscript: "Genuine infinity [*wahrhaffte Unendlichkeit*] is the realized requirement that the determinacy sublate itself. . . . This alone is the true nature of the finite: that it is infinite, that it sublates itself in its being."[57]

Now science, first of all, no longer remains as the repeated, merely external demonstration of the identity of opposites, but rather exists in the self-movement of its own fundamental concepts; and second of all, transcendental intuition, in the sense that it possessed until then, becomes superfluous, and, as such, Hegel interprets the realization of a concept as a transformation of this concept into what it should be (its totality or form of completion). Of course, the dialectical development of opposites is still initiated through our reflection; at the end of logic, however, reflection—which is the object of logical investigation—passes over in the knowledge of itself and becomes absolute reflection.

At this point, Hegel had thus attempted, in a fundamental step in his dissociation from Schelling, to apply the morphological method to the logic of 1804 itself and to make these concepts—the transitions between which he thematizes—fluid, or rather to present their "inner life."[58] Thus Hegel could then very well believe that he had carried out a "purely scientific treatment of philosophy," just as he had written about to Goethe and that he had intended to present to him. However, he did not; rather, the fragment breaks off suddenly in the section on "Naturphilosophie," at the transition to the organic, and does not continue.

Why? What is missing other than the self-movement of the concept? Why is the essay ultimately rejected? This question only allows itself to be answered, in my view, if one casts a glance at what Hegel instead attempts to do: Hegel is preparing lectures on the entire history of philosophy, which he presents for the first time in the winter semester of 1805. Such a sudden turn toward history is itself very surprising. Until this point, Hegel held the already described view of his *Differenzschrift*, that there would not really be a historical development of philosophy. Insofar as each real philosophy, according to Hegel, is a systematic knowledge of the absolute based on the resources of a given age, the idea of the absolute (this also applies to Hegel himself, even in "Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie")[59] thus always stands at the beginning of the system; therefore these systems stand essentially equal in rank, side by side, like great works of art: "Every philosophy is complete in

itself, and like an authentic work of art, carries the totality within itself."[60]

The difference between this and the conception of 1805 could hardly be greater. Not only does he present his students for the first time in 1805 the *complete series* of the historical shapes of philosophical systems up until the present; but also, in the introduction to these same lectures he says further: "The point here is that we can summarize this in the sole determination of 'development.' When this becomes clear to us, then everything else will emerge and follow from it."[61]

Thus, we must seek to understand this "sole determination of 'development.'" Interestingly enough, Hegel now illustrates what is meant by this in the same introduction on the basis of the metamorphosis of plants. The plant, according to Hegel, goes through a cycle from seed to fruit that is governed by the in-itself [*Ansich*] (in Goethean terms: the idea) of the plant. At the end of the cycle there is again a seed, a new, differentiated individual from the first seed, that runs through the same process anew.

> The seed wants to bring forth itself, to return to itself. What is there is exposed and then again withdraws into the unity from which it came. It is of course the case with natural things that the subject, or that with which we began, and the existing thing, which consists in the end—fruit, seeds—are two different individuals . . . only according to the*contents* are they the same. (VGP 51)

Thus, Hegel continues:

> With spirit [*Geist*] it is otherwise. It is consciousness, free, that is why in it, the beginning and end coincide. . . . The fruit, the seed, does not become for the first seed, but rather, only for us; spirit is both, not only the same nature *in-itself* [*an sich*], but rather it is also being-for-another [*Füreinanderseyn*], and even thereby being-for-itself [*Fürsichseyn*]. That for which the other is, is the same as the other. Only through the other is spirit at one with itself in its other. The development of spirit is something that comes out of itself, sunders itself, and at the same time returns to itself. (Ibid.)

In other words, the kind of experience that is exemplarily developed in the metamorphosis of plants is applied to spirit, or rather, its shapes, which give rise to something entirely new. To summarize the above, one can say: The plant turns into the equal of itself in another individual, which begins the process anew; spirit, however, *is* the other of itself. With this, however, what is essential is still not expressed. Hegel had already used precisely this formulation of the other of itself in "Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie" to describe absolute spirit, which in the end is thought according to the model of life (see GW 7, 174f.; GW 7, 181).[62] For life, as infinite and "equal to itself," likewise

only *is* insofar as the other of itself (the finite living being) *is*, without the former being identical with the latter. However, as Hegel now organizes the philosophical systems in a complete series and thematizes the transitions between them, something new arises, an "experience of a higher kind." These historical shapes, these systems, do not return to the starting point and moreover do not stand equal in rank, side by side, like great works of art. Rather, they pass out of and beyond themselves and thus become others of themselves. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel expresses this in the following way: "This *dialectical* movement is what consciousness practices on itself as well as on its knowledge and its object, and, *insofar as, to consciousness, the new, true object arises* out of this movement, this dialectical movement is what is genuinely called *experience*."[63] Not a new, second individual, but rather the first object itself becomes the "new, true object" and contains the experience that was made of it.[64] That is to say, consciousness *develops itself*, and therewith also the idea, which is spirit itself.

If this is correct, then it must however also be the case that what can be accepted as a valid scientific method of philosophy changes again. Once again we can turn to a passage from the lectures on the history of philosophy:

> But in fact, when the concept of philosophy is established, not arbitrarily but in a scientific way, such treatment [of its history—EF] becomes the science of philosophy itself. For in this science the peculiar characteristic is that its concept forms the beginning in appearance merely, and it is only the whole treatment of the science that is the proof, and indeed we may say the finding of its concept; and this is really a result of that treatment. (VGP 25–6)

This allows us to understand why Hegel suddenly ceased writing "Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie," which indeed (as he wrote to Goethe) is meant to be a purely scientific treatment of philosophy. For there the idea of the absolute stands as that which is equal to itself at the beginning: "the logic began with unity itself as the self-equivalent."[65] This now appears unscientific.[66] The absolute, or rather the idea, can stand at the beginning of logic and conduct the movement of the concept neither as intellectual or "transcendental" intuition (as is the case, for example, in the *Differenzschrift*) nor as the "equal-with-itself" soil of logic (as in "Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie")[67]; rather, it can *only* be the result: "Now it is essentially in the nature of the Idea to develop, and only through development to arrive at comprehension of itself, or to become what it is" (VGP 49).

With this Hegel had found that which confirms what I above characterized as the second main point concerning the theory of metamorphosis that he and Schelver likely learned from Goethe:[68] that grasping a

complete series of forms or shapes as an organic whole necessarily precedes knowledge of the idea. However, at the same time, Hegel had taken a most important step beyond Goethe: the idea that what philosophy seeks to know is not only first knowable at the end of a complete series of shapes, but furthermore only is itself what it is at the end of such a series—it is in essence process and dialectic.

This has a double consequence for Hegel's own conception of systematicity: *First*, the naturally assumed differentiation between logic and metaphysics—held until 1804—must be sublated [*aufgehoben*]. For until then, logic was supposed to play the role of showing the dialectical nature of the finite and of leading to the standpoint of speculation; metaphysics, however, was to be the "science of the idea" and to present this systematically. With this, the idea was thought as the "unity itself,"[69] which "is eternally one and the same."[70] If the idea, however, develops itself, and if it is essentially dialectical, then metaphysics is also dialectical as its science, and thereby, so is logic. The division into two distinct disciplines becomes spurious.

As the new logic has to present the idea in its development, and thereby as a known presuppostion, it must—*second*—move through a complete series of those shapes of consciousness, through which the idea, in the end, lets itself be known: a representation of the metamorphosis of spirit, a "Science of the Experience of Consciousness," as the original title of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* reads. The given order of the shapes of consciousness in this work—which do not exactly correspond to a historical chronology, but rather, just as the plants in the botanical garden are planted where they *must* stand in order to enable the survey of the whole—is, in the end, only understandable against this background. Along these lines, in his own advertisement for the *Phenomenology*, Hegel writes that his book

> comprehends within itself the various SHAPES OF SPIRIT as stations on the way through which spirit becomes pure knowledge, that is, absolute spirit. . . . The wealth of the appearances of spirit, which at first glance seem to be only chaotic, is brought into a scientific order, exhibiting them in terms of their necessity.[71]

As mentioned above, Goethe named the observation of the transformation of one form into another within a complete series an "imaginary ladder" [*geistige Leiter*] (M 6), which the scientist must climb if he wants to know the idea. Significantly, Hegel also characterizes his *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the preface as a "ladder," which must be climbed in order to reach speculation.[72] That this choice of words is not a coincidence seems to me to be suggested through lectures years later in which Hegel still explicitly describes Goethe's *Metamorphosis of*

Plants as an "imaginary ladder" [*geistige Leiter*].[73] Moreover, it is not difficult to see that the *Phenomenology* realized precisely the methodological program described here: (1) the production of a complete series of shapes of consciousness; (2) observing and comprehending the series as a whole, whereby what matters are the transitions between the shapes; so that in the end (3) knowledge of the idea, the "pure concept" or "absolute knowing" can take place.[74]

Precisely because the transitions are what is decisive and the particular shapes of consciousness are, in the end, only *examples* of this—what in specific parts of the text must take place in order to allow the whole as whole to vividly come to be—something that was otherwise hardly comprehensible becomes understandable: why Hegel complained after the publication of the *Phenomenology* that the majority of reviewers preoccupied themselves primarily with the "contents" of the work! For "[w]hat is mainly to be emphasized in all philosophizing, and now more than ever, is of course the method of necessary connection, the transition of one form into another [*in the draft*: transition and emergence of one form to the other—EF]"[75]

5.

For now I would like to leave it at that. To be sure, the significance of §§76 and 77 of the *Critique of Judgment* for the development of post-Kantian philosophy is not yet exhausted. For me however, it came down above all to, first, distinguishing the concept of intuitive understanding from the concept of intellectual intuition in all clarity, and secondly, making visible the significance of this distinction for the change in Hegel's Jena conception of system around 1804. The realization of the fundamental difference of both for pointing beyond Kant's modes of cognition constitutes in my opinion the true reason for Hegel's break with Schelling, who focused entirely on intellectual intuition and who still in his last letter to Hegel showed his lack of understanding of this distinction.[76] That intellectual intuition does not do justice to the "inner life" and the "development" of its object, but rather is also no longer required as soon as the change to the intuitive understanding as a mode of cognition is carried out—this is Hegel's crucial insight in Jena after Schelling's departure, which then received its classic formulation in the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

On my view, the insight into the significance of intuitive understanding could have been conveyed to him at this time only through Goethe.

Many questions regarding the further development of Hegel's system must here remain necessarily open, not the least of which is the

later renewed question of the introduction to the system of science. Furthermore, Hegel's debate with Goethe is not yet concluded with the *Phenomenology*. Here there is perhaps still something new to discover; something well known may still be considered from an entirely new perspective. Although it must by now be clear that what Hegel wrote to Goethe in 1825, which I placed at the beginning of this part of my essay as a motto, should be taken more seriously than it has been hitherto:

> For when I look back over the course of my intellectual development, I see you everywhere woven into it, and may call myself one of your sons: what is inward in me has been nourished by you [in its growth] toward resilient strength in the face of abstraction, and has oriented its course by your forms as by beacons.

Translated by Karen Ng and Matthew Congdon

NOTES

1. G.W.F. Hegel to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, April 24, 1825, in *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 708.
2. Part 1 of this essay was translated as Eckart Förster, "The Significance of §§76 and 77 of the *Critique of Judgment* for the Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy (Part 1)," trans. Matthew Congdon and Karen Ng, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 30:2 (2009), pp. 197–217.
3. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, trans. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), p. 81.
4. Ibid., p. 110; emphasis added.
5. F.W.J. Schelling, *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*, in vol. 2 of *Werke*, ed. Manfred Schröter (Munich: C.H. Beck and R. Oldenbourg, 1927–59), pp. 23–4, cf. pp. 4, 10; henceforth SW, followed by volume and page number. [A partial English translation of this text, through §54, can be found in F.W.J. Schelling, *Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801)*, trans. Michael G. Vater, *The Philosophical Forum* 32:4 (2001), pp. 339–71.—Trans.]
6. F.W.J. Schelling to Johann Gottlieb Fichte, October 3, 1801, in pt. 3 of vol. 5 of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Erich Fuchs, Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacobs, and Hans Gliwitzky (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1964–), pp. 80–1.
7. Cf. among others, Horst Fuhrmans, "Schelling und Hegel: Ihre Entfremdung," in F.W.J. Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. 1, ed. Horst Fuhrmans (Bonn: Bouvier, 1962), pp. 451–553; Hermann Krings, "Die Entfremdung

zwischen Schelling und Hegel," *Sitzungsberichte der philosophischhis - torischen Klasse der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 6 (1976), pp. 3–24.

8. For example, the debate with skepticism, as well as the problems concerning ethical life and the concept of spirit, belong to this discussion. For a general overview of the debates, see Rolf-Peter Horstmann, "Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen," in *Hegel*, ed. Otto Pöggeler (Munich: Karl Alber, 1977), pp. 43–58.

9. With qualifications, this is also valid for Dieter Henrich's important attempt to reconstruct, from a purely immanent perspective, Hegel's Jena development (see his "Andersheit und Absolutheit des Geistes: Sieben Schritte auf dem Wege von Schelling zu Hegel," in *Selbstverhältnisse*, ed. Dieter Henrich [Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982], pp. 142–72). Although Henrich can indeed give good reasons for why the distinction between logic and metaphysics must become invalid, it nevertheless also remains completely unclear why the new logic must be preceded by a *phenomenology*. However, Henrich also explicitly relinquishes the claim "to uncover the real connection of the motive of thought in the process of Hegel's development" (ibid., p. 154).

10. G.W.F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, trans. Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), p. 91. See here the excellent account in Manfred Baum, *Die Entstehung der Hegelschen Dialektik* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1986), esp. pp. 31f., 113f., 133f. However, Baum also does not distinguish between intellectual intuition and intuitive understanding.

11. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 107.

12. Cf. Klaus-Dieter Müller, *Franz Joseph Schelver: Romantischer Naturphilosoph, Botaniker und Magnetiseur im Zeitalter Goethes* (Stuttgart: Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992); and also Thomas Bach, "'Für wen das hier gesagte nicht gesagt ist, der wird es nicht für überflüssig halten': Franz Joseph Schelvers Beitrag zur Naturphilosophie um 1800," in *Naturwissenschaften um 1800*, ed. Olaf Breidbach and Paul Ziche (Weimar: Böhlaus Nachfolger, 2001), pp. 65–82.

13. In his *curriculum vitae*, Schelver wrote, "maximum Fichtium in scientia transcendentali in Logica et Metaphysica, in Ethica et naturali phylosophico Ducem Habui" (cited in Müller, *Schelver*, p. 17).

14. A note from this lecture is located in the Heidelberg University Library under the call number, Hd-HS-1358 [Heidelberg-Handschrift-1358].

15. Franz Joseph Schelver, *Zeitschrift für organische Physik* 1:1–2 (1802–3).

16. Ibid., p. 17.

17. Ibid., pp. 31–2.

18. Franz Joseph Schelver, review of Andreas Röschlaub, *Über die Afteranwendung des neusten Systemes der Philosophie auf der Medizin*, *Erlanger Literatur-Zeitung* 4 (1802), p. 32; and Franz Joseph Schelver, review of Andreas Röschlaub, *Über medizin ihr verhältnifs zur chirurgie nebst mate -*

rialien zu einem Entwurfe der Polizei der Medizin, *Erlanger Literatur-Zeitung* 19 (1802), pp. 151f.

19. "He indeed acts as if he were my disciple, and seems completely to possess the philosophy of nature; however, a lot is missing from the latter." (Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. 1, p. 254).

20. Cf. F.W.J. Schelling to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, January 24, 1803, in Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. 2, p. 485.

21. Cited in Irmtraut Schmid, *Die naturwissenschaftslichen Institute bei der Universität Jena unter Goethes Oberaufsicht* (PhD Diss., Humbolt University, 1979), pp. 49–50; emphasis added.

22. Cf. for example Johann Wolfgang von Goethe to Johann Georg Karl Batsch, 26 February 1794, in pt. 4 of vol. 10 of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Werke* (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1887–1919), p. 144.

23. The contract is reprinted in Schmid, *Die naturwissenschaftslichen Institute*, pp. 251–2.

24. Goethe retained and also recorded the relevant agreements with Schelver on April 23, 1803; cf. Schmid, *Die naturwissenschaftslichen Institute*, p. 34.

25. To my knowledge, the ever-growing scholarship on Hegel has until now hardly paid any attention to the details and extent of this friendship. Goethe frequently invited Schelver and Hegel over together; reports from this time in Jena repeatedly mention the two friends in the same breath. Here, to serve as one example among many, see a letter from Adam Müller to Carl Gustav von Brinkmann on August 21, 1804: "I was also in Jena this summer and stayed with both men, with Schelver and with Hegel, both of whom were great company" (cited in Erich Fuchs, Reinhard Lauth, and Walter Schieche, eds., *J.G. Fichte im Gespräch*, vol. 3 [Stuttgart: Frommann, 1981], p. 264).

26. G.W.F. Hegel to F.W.J. Schelling, November 16, 1803, in *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 69; trans. mod.

27. Franz Joseph Schelver to F.W.J. Schelling, October 27, 1803 (cited in Müller, *Schelver*, pp. 177f.).

28. Johan Wolfgang von Goethe to Friedrich Schiller, November 27, 1803, in Goethe, *Werke*, vol. 16, pt. 4, p. 356; emphasis added. Cf. also the diary entry from this day (Goethe, *Werke*, vol. 3, pt. 3, p. 88). Further visits to Schelver (and/or Hegel) are noted in the 1803 diary on March 10; May 2; October 20; November 8; November 30; December 2 (Hegel); December 3 (Hegel); December 8 (Hegel); and December 20 (Hegel).

29. The lecture announcements are cited in Bach, "Franz Joseph Schelvers Beitrag zur Naturphilosophie um 1800," p. 73.

30. Cited in Müller, *Schelver*, p. 175.

31. Cited in Schmid, *Die naturwissenschaftslichen Institute*, p. 35.

32. Four days after the Battle of Jena, Schelver wrote to Goethe: "My house has been completely robbed. . . . The botanical museum lies scattered through the whole house, my herbarium is totally destroyed and lies on the ground around water and dirt. My books serve as ignition for fire. . . . My clothes were removed from me in my house and, with them, what was left of my money robbed from me" (cited in Johann Daniel Falk, *Goethe, Weimar und Jena im Jahre 1806*, ed. Richard Keil and Robert Keil [Leipzig: Edwin Schloemp, 1882], p. 62).

33. Indeed, Goethe additionally regarded the denial of the sexes of plants, for which Schelver would later vehemently be attacked, as one-sided but also as following logically from the further development of his own thought on metamorphosis. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Gespräche*, ed. Wolfgang Herwig (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1998), vol. 2, p. 788.

34. Franz Joseph Schelver, *Lebens- und Formgeschichte der Pflanzenwelt* (Heidelberg: Joseph Engelmann, 1822), pp. vi–vii. In this connection, see also Schelver's letter to Goethe from February 6, 1805: "The attention that you have been so kind to pay to my botanical works lifts me up and strengthens me; this attention demands from me to finish and to bring to the public what you alone so lovingly and like a father first awoke and cultivated in me. I will do this in order to delight you, and to be worthy of the holy moment when you decided to welcome and establish me here in Jena" (cited in Müller, *Schelver*, p. 167).

35. Goethe, *Gespräche*, pt. 1 of vol. 3, p. 577.

36. Karl Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977), pp. 220, 198.

37. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe to Friedrich Schiller, November 27, 1803 (Goethe, *Werke*, vol. 16, pt. 4, p. 256).

38. Cited in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Begegnungen und Gespräche*, ed. Ernst Grumach and Renate Grumach, vol. 5 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), p. 501.

39. Cited in Günther Nicolin, ed., *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1970), p. 79.

40. G.W.F. Hegel to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, September 29, 1804, in *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 685.

41. See the editorial remark in G.W.F. Hegel, *Jenaer Systementwürfe,* vols. 6-–8 of *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Johann Heinrich Trede (Hamburg: Felix Meiner: 1968–), vol. 7, pp. 360–2; henceforth GW, followed by volume and page number.

42. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe to Karl Ludwig von Knebel, March 14, 1807, in Goethe, *Werke*, vol. 19, pt. 4, p. 283.

43. G.W.F. Hegel to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, end of January 1807, in *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 686.

44. Karl Ludwig von Knebel to Henriette von Knebel, May 15, 1807, cited in Goethe, *Begegnungen und Gespräche*, vol. 6, p. 143.

45. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären* (Gotha: Ettinger, 1790), §73; henceforth M, followed by section number; Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *The Metamorphosis of Plants in Goethe's Botantical Writings*, trans. Bertha Mueller (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1952), §73.

46. See my "On the Significance of §§76 and 77 of the *Critique of Judgment* (Part 1)," §3, pp. 197–217, which is presupposed here.

47. Goethe often expresses this idea (and somewhat misleadingly) with the expression, "All is leaf." More precisely, however, the physical leaf is, as is the case for all the external organs of the plant, a particular formation of the underlying idea; *all* forms of the plant are identical according to *the idea*: "The same organ which expanded on the stem as a leaf and assumed a highly diverse form, will contract in the calyx, expand again in the petal, contract in the reproductive organs, and expand for the last time as fruit" (M 115).

48. See F.W.J. Schelling to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, January 26, 1801: "The metamorphosis of plants according to your presentation has proved itself to me as the fundamental schema of all organic development, and already brought home to me the inner identity of all organizations among themselves. . . . The metamorphosis already seems to occur prior to organic nature, and also appears to be the word of chemical puzzles" (Schelling, *Briefe und Dokumente*, vol. 1, pp. 243, 240).

49. See also ibid.

50. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §15; emphasis added; trans. mod.

51. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §§51, 53; emphasis added.

52. Ibid., §53.

53. G.W.F. Hegel, "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy: Exposition of Its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One," in *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, trans. and ed. George di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), p. 340.

54. A partial translation of this essay is available in G.W.F Hegel, *The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics*, trans. John W. Burbidge and George di Giovanni (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986).

55. Hegel, *The Jena System, 1804–5*, p. 5; trans mod. Cf. F.W.J. Schelling, *Presentation of My System of Philosophy*, §44 Z; and *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), pp. 39–41, 43f. I do not agree with the editor of volume 7 of Hegel's *Gesammelte Werke*, who interprets this place in the text as a critique of Fichte (GW 7, 369), and indeed with reference to GW 4, 395–400, where there is neither discussion of real and ideal activities, nor of limits. It should also be noted, in my view, that Hegel explains the "real activity" on the basis of the (Kantian/Schellingian) con-

struction of matter out of attraction and repulsion with its immanent complexities (GW 7, 4.8–5.12).

56. Hegel, *The Jena System, 1804–5*, p. 8.

57. Hegel, *The Jena System, 1804–5*, p. 35.

58. See also Karl Friedrich Bachman: "Hegel was still my teacher here in Jena, and I confess that I owe him much. He first made me attentive to the gaps in the Schellingian system, which at the time I took with youthful enthusiasm, and directed my attention to the thought that philosophy could only become science through the most rigorous method, through the inner necessity of the matter at hand [*der Sache selbst*] in the measured progress from one moment to the other" (cited in *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, p. 80).

59. This is one of the concerns of Anne-Kristina Kwade, *Grenze: Hegels "Grenz"-Begriff 1804/05 als Keimzelle der Dialektic* (Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 2000).

60. Hegel, *The Difference*, p. 89.

61. G.W.F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 17 of *Sämtliche Werke: Jubiläumsausgabe*, ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927–40), p. 48; henceforth WJ, followed by page number. Indeed, this is the version of the text that the editor, Karl Ludwig Michelet, edited from later manuscripts as well as lecture transcripts. He found in these greater "clarity, soundness, and cogency" (WJ 3), than in the Jena introduction of 1805, which had also been available to him. To assume an *objective* distinction between the introductions is thus not justified. Rosenkranz also writes concerning the Jena lecture of 1805: "Hegel did not essentially change these lectures on the history of philosophy in his later presentations, as they were also printed, but only explained them with more richness and depth" (Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 201).

62. [The first of these two page references can be found in Hegel, *The Jena System, 1804–5*, pp. 181f.; the second reference is not included in this volume's partial translation of "Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie," and remains, as far as we can tell, untranslated—Trans.]

63. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Terry Pinkard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), §86 .

64. This goes well with Rosenkranz's remark: "He [Hegel] develops here, initially in his introduction to the [lectures on] logic and metaphysics, the concept of experience, which consciousness makes from itself. From this arises as early as 1804 the plan of phenomenology, in which he deposits the best results of his studies up to that point" (Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, p. 208).

65. Hegel, *The Jena System, 1804–5*, p. 134.

66. Hegel criticizes Schelling accordingly in a lecture from this period: "Schelling, in his later view of philosophy, elaborates the speculative idea

in general *without development* in itself, and as such it passes over at once to the form it had in the philosophy of nature" (GW 5, 472).

67. See Hegel, *The Jena System, 1804–5*, pp. 134, 129.

68. See p. 333 of this essay.

69. Hegel, *The Jena System, 1804–5*, p. 134.

70. Hegel, *The Difference*, p. 87.

71. G.W.F. Hegel, "Selbstanzeige der *Phänomenologie*" (GW 9, 446); G.W.F. Hegel, "Advertisement for the *Phenomenology*," trans. Terry Pinkard, accessed September 24, 2010, http://web.mac.com/titpaul/Site/Phenomenology_of_Spirit_page.html.

72. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, §26.

73. G.W.F. Hegel, *Die Naturphilosophie,* vol. 9 of *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, vols. 8–10 of *Werke*, ed. Eva Moldenauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), §345 Z.

74. After this, the*Logic* naturally no longer concerns itself with these shapes, but presents the pure concept in its movement; cf., along these lines, the last four paragraphs of the*Phenomenology*,§§805–8.

75. G.W.F. Hegel to Peter van Ghert, October 15, 1810, in *Hegel: The Letters*, p. 590.

76. "So I confess, until now, to have not grasped your meaning, when you oppose *Concept* and intuition. You can mean by this nothing other than what you and I have named Idea, whose nature is just to have one side in which it is Concept, and another side in which it intuition" (G.W.F. Hegel, *Briefe von und an Hegel*, vol. 1, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952], p. 194).