Review article

Richard Dien Winfield. *Hegel and Mind: Rethinking Philosophical Psychology* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). Pp. 170.

I. The Concept of Mind

What Hegel means by *Geist* —translated as mind or spirit, depending on the occasion— is one of the continuing battlefronts of Hegelian scholarship. Its boundaries are difficult to determine, and Hegel discusses everything from nature, soul, habit, desire, consciousness, self-consciousness, recognition, sociality, language, thought, ancient Greek tragedy, Roman law, *Bildung*, the French revolution, romantic irony, rights, morality, the family, the state, ethical life, not to mention art, religion, and philosophy itself, all under the heading of *Geist*. In light of the ubiquity of this essentially untranslatable term, Richard Winfield's *Hegel and Mind* is a concise and ambitious book that attempts to defend Hegel's 'philosophy of mind' as both superior to contemporary philosophy of mind and as an invaluable resource for resolving prevailing problems within that discipline. Focusing on the 'Subjective Spirit' section of the third part of Hegel's *Encylopaedia*, Winfield appears to bracket the question of what Hegel means by *Geist* more broadly and reconstructs the main arguments of that text as a genetic, developmental account of mental reality, one that provides the 'psychological conditions for philosophical reason' (p. xi). In particular, Winfield's reconstruction of the progression from anthropology, phenomenology, to psychology centres on problems of mind/body dualism, artificial intelligence, consciousness, language, discursivity, and the possibility that knowledge about mind can provide a foundation for truth.

The bracketing of the larger problem of the meaning of *Geist* in Hegel's philosophy is helpful insofar as it allows Winfield to maintain a relatively streamlined discussion that remains conversant with familiar debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. However, this strategy can also be misleading insofar as Hegel's presuppositions, object, scope, and method, even if we restrict ourselves to the philosophy of subjective spirit, differ vastly from anything that we would recognise as congruent with those debates today. Such a bracketing is even more problematic when we consider that the philosophy of subjective spirit does not form a self-enclosed whole, but constitutes only the first part of the philosophy of mind, which is itself a part of a philosophical system that also includes discussions of logic and

nature. This is not to say that one must analyze the whole of Hegel's system in order to say anything of interest about the parts, nor that Hegel's texts do not speak to contemporary concerns; however, a discussion of the term *Geist* and the difficulties of translating that term are conspicuously missing.[1] Winfield seems to take for granted that the object under investigation, namely 'mind,' is not only unambiguous, but further, that whatever its shortcomings may be, the object of contemporary philosophy of mind is the same as that of Hegel's, an assumption that at the very least, requires some argumentative support. This lack of precision regarding the object of investigation renders some of the arguments in the book vague and in need of more detailed elaboration and analysis.

Nevertheless, the great strength of Winfield's *Hegel and Mind* consists in his lucid reconstructions of the progression from soul (*Seele*) to consciousness (*Bewußtsein*), and finally to mind itself (*Geist*), a general overview of which is provided in chapter one.[2] Furthermore, Winfield presents this progression as a powerful rejoinder to what he takes to be three persistent tendencies in modern considerations of mind. The first is the focus on mind/body dualism and on different versions of the 'explanatory gap' problem. In addition to showing why Hegel's account not only resolves, but precludes such problems, Winfield also presents an argument against the possibility that developments in artificial intelligence might one day allow computers and machines to simulate thinking and mindedness itself. At stake in this discussion is the relation between mind and life and whether or not one can take place without the other. Secondly, *contra* thinkers like Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom, Winfield argues against the reduction of mindedness to consciousness and the concomitant equation of consciousness with discursivity and language use. Unlike modern theories of mind, Hegel's developmental account allows us to understand how conceptual and linguistic capacities are acquired through education, practice, and habit, taking into account many dimensions of mental life that neither require nor can be fully captured by discursive categories. For Winfield, this is significant for at least two reasons. First, it allows us to see how the opposition of consciousness and its model of representation can be overcome, which is a central argument not only in Hegel's account of subjective spirit, but also in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[3] Secondly, in making language and conceptuality an aspect of mental life that requires development, Winfield avoids what he takes to be a pragmatic, relativistic, linguistic holism that renders all knowledge contingent upon linguistic convention.

Finally, Winfield argues that Hegel's philosophy of mind allows us to disassociate psychological from epistemological concerns, attacking the tendency of modern theories of mind to lean on mind as an epistemological foundation. Although a theory of mind may provide us with the psychological conditions for thought, those conditions make possible *all* thoughts, both true and false, and thus cannot provide a foundation for truth or knowledge. Thus, Winfield suggests that we must separate logical from psychological concerns and uses his reading of Hegel's *Logic* to

substantiate a presuppositionless thinking without foundations that can overcome the problems of skepticism.

In the following, I will assess Winfield's treatment of these three arguments as they are developed through his reading of Hegel's subjective spirit. A recurring theme throughout his discussion is that the distinctive character of mind consists in a self-relation and self-actualisation, a reflexivity that is productive of the various stages of mind as well as its progressive development. That mind is self-actualising and ultimately self-determining is what drives Winfield's argument against foundationalism in general and the idea that consciousness or mind can be an epistemological foundation for truth in particular. However, despite Winfield's incisive reconstruction of the moves within subjective spirit, the absolute separation of logic and psychology, especially as it pertains to the relation between logic and *Realphilosophie* in general, poses some interpretive difficulties in connection with Hegel's views on life, skepticism, and truth, many of which stem from a lack of discussion of the more systematic meaning of *Geist* and its characteristic self-relation in Hegel's thought.

II. Mind and Life

The problem of mind/body dualism can be posed in terms of the subjectivity of mind, a subjectivity that is at once undeniable and inscrutable. Characteristic of inner life and experience, the immediacy and certainty of the 'I think' in all its various permutations has made it difficult to reconcile with outer experience, whether of our own bodies, of other minds, or of the external world. In chapters two and three, Winfield lays out two familiar tactics in accounting for the phenomenon of mindedness: either minds are conceived as 'wholly immaterial,' or mind is reduced to materialist or physicalist explanations (p.43). In the former case, mind is not only immaterial, but represents the most immediate certainty and serves as the ground of knowledge. However, the immateriality of mind makes it difficult to explain how we could have experience of the world or of other minds, creating a gulf between subjective and objective experience that leads to the traditional problems of skepticism, both of the external world and of other minds. In the latter case, reductionist explanations precisely fail to explain the phenomenon at hand: in reducing mind to inanimate matter and the efficient causal structure that governs it, materialist accounts can explain neither the reflexivity of mind, its self-relating and self-actualising nature, nor the causality of purposes that makes such reflexivity possible (p.29). The subjective, first-personal character of mind also remains mysterious from the materialist perspective.

To counter the immaterialist view championed for example by Descartes and Berkeley, Winfield refers repeatedly to Kant's refutation of idealism, where he proves that our inner experience of time requires outer experience of objects in space (pp.26, 44, 61–2). Winfield further enlists Strawson and Merleau-Ponty in order to show that

mind cannot be individuated unless it is connected to a unique body located in time and space (pp.26, 65–7). While these arguments are helpful, it seems that Hegel takes a slightly different route, given that he presumes, with Aristotle, not only an original unity of mind and body,[4] but a deep continuity between mind and life in general,[5] one that will have consequences for his treatment of truth and the problem of skepticism. For Hegel, every shape of *Geist is* simply a different form of self-relating (living) mind-body unity (p.30, 39): the soul begins as a natural soul, immersed in self-feeling, eventually developing habits and detaching a world from itself when self-feeling becomes sensation; consciousness begins as sensory consciousness, with self-consciousness being 'ignited' by the appearance of life (EPM §418Z), emerging as desire (*Begierde*)[6] and engaging in processes of recognition.[7] Theoretical mind begins as intuition, developing linguistic capacities through imagination and memory, emerging eventually as thought; and practical mind begins as feeling, developing into free mind through urges (*Triebe*), willfulness (*Willkür*), and happiness (*Glückseligkeit*).[8] In light of its intrinsic connection to embodied life, awareness of self ultimately also requires an awareness of other embodied minds, but the full argument for this does not come until chapter four.

To counter the reductive materialism attributed primarily to Spinoza and recent quantum mechanics theorists such as Roger Penrose,[9] Winfield presents an argument demonstrating that efficient causality and mechanism underdetermine the phenomenon at hand and can explain neither the reflexivity nor purposiveness necessarily characteristic of mind (pp.28ff., 44–5). This argument is particularly convincing in connection with the question of the possibility that machines or computers can simulate mindedness, a question that Winfield answers resolutely in the negative. More specifically, even within a logic of purposes, a distinction must be made, following Kant,[10] between external and intrinsic purposiveness, with the former governing the structure of artifacts, and the latter governing exclusively the self-organisation of living things. Mechanistic, efficient causality, characteristic of a Newtonian worldview, 'always constitutes a descending series (of causes to effects): the things that are the effects, and that hence presuppose others as their causes, cannot themselves in turn be causes of these others.'[11] Since cause and effect proceed linearly in a single direction, mechanism cannot account for 'how mind acts upon its own determinations,' how *Geist* is in essence self-actualising, the cause *and* effect of itself (pp.29–30). In order to explain the structure of self-relating mind as both means and end, a causality according to purposes is required: '[purposive causal connection], considered as a series, would carry with it dependence both as it ascends and as it descends: here we could call a thing the effect of something and still be entitled to call it, as the series ascends, the cause of that something as well.'[12] However, so long as means and ends remain separate and external to one another, the logic of purposes only takes us as far as explaining artifacts and usefulness; *only* in living organisms is the

logic of purposes *intrinsic*, that is, where both means and end are internal to a particular object.

In fact, something being a cause and effect of itself is how Kant defines a natural purpose (*Naturzweck*) or living organism in general,[13] and what is crucial here is that this teleological structure also describes the logic of self-determination and autonomy. Hegel presents a similar line of argument in the *Logic*, both, as Winfield points out, in the transition from the *Wesenslogik* to the *Begriffslogik*, and in the progression from mechanism, chemism, teleology, and finally to the concept of life within the *Begriffslogik* itself (pp.30f.,45ff.). In both instances, overcoming mechanism as well as the logic of external purposes is necessary insofar as self-determination and the unity of concept and objectivity are at stake. Thus, concerning both the possibility of artificial intelligence possessing mind, and the possibility of reducing mind to mechanism, Winfield writes:

> The purpose of artifacts thus derives from makers who produce with a nonderivative aim. Artificial intelligence therefore depends upon a natural intelligence capable of giving itself ends in a way that cannot be modeled on an artifact's derivative functionality. Although computing machines might display the purposiveness of mental calculation, this conferred goal-directedness can never exhibit the *autonomous* setting of goals rendering natural minds irreducible to any artifact. (p.49; my emphasis)

Only a logic of internal teleology is appropriate for explaining the nature of self-determining mind, thus precluding the reduction of mind to mechanism or externally formed matter.

However, is the logic of life and intrinsic purposes *sufficient* for explaining the nature of mind? Winfield seems to waver slightly on this question. On the one hand, he dismisses the possibility that mind can be explained by the categories of life on the first page of the introduction (p.x), and further argues that a strictly Aristotelian solution is inadequate for explaining the specific mind/body unity characteristic of mind. First, in defining soul as the animating principle of life, Aristotle resorts to a relation of external purposiveness between active soul and passive matter. Secondly, this definition of soul, in reducing mind to organic unity, necessarily ascribes a soul to *all* life forms and not only to human beings, thus again eclipsing the subjectivity specific to mind that we are trying to explain. 'Although mind may well be something alive,' Winfield writes, 'that does not entail that all life possesses mind' (p.32). He appears to identify the position of 'conceiving mind in terms of life' fully with Aristotle (p.31), but it seems that Hegel's conception of the relation between mind and life (not to mention a more generous reading of Aristotle) can avoid the above objections. Three points in particular are relevant here. First, Hegel neither reduces

life or mind to mere organic unity, nor does he resort to a logic of external purposes in order to explain living organisation. Rather, the concept of life for Hegel is possible exclusively according to the logic of intrinsic purposiveness,[14] and in contrast with metaphors of organic unity, Hegel develops the concept of life primarily through the notions of original division (*Ur-teil*), diremption (*Entzweiung*), and negativity.[15] Secondly, Hegel argues that life, like mind, already contains the element of subjectivity. Rather than referring to an organism as such, Hegel discusses the living *individual*, the living subject and its process.[16] As the term *self*-relation already points out, both life and mind already contain an element of subjectivity because there can be no relation to self without an individuated self. Thus, Hegel writes of life that it is 'an ideality which is *fulfilled*, and as self-related *negative* unity, has essentially developed the nature of *self* [selbstische] and become *subjective*.'[17] As noted above, although Winfield argues that mind must be individuated, he does not think that individuation is possible at the level of mere life, a position that Hegel himself does not hold.[18]

Finally and most importantly, life for Hegel is the first form of the Idea, or the first Idea of the Idea, and insofar as concept and reality coincide in living form, life for Hegel expresses a form of truth. This form of truth attains its highest and most concrete shape in *Geist*, implying both that mind is a form of life, and that mind distinguishes itself from life in a way that constitutes its very nature. Thus, Winfield's negative conclusions regarding the possibility that we can conceive mind in terms of life rest primarily on his turning to an ungenerously considered Aristotle rather than a Hegel who was deeply inspired by Aristotle, a Hegel whose texts present much more positive conclusions in this regard. Although it is beyond the scope of this review to explore these possibilities here, Winfield's analysis would have benefited from further discussion of Hegel's own remarks on the relation between life and mind. This is particularly important not only because Winfield consistently refers to mind as a form of self-activity (what kind of self-activity is *Geist*? how is its form of self-activity continuous or discontinuous with life?), but further, because *Geist* for Hegel is always systematically defined in its simultaneous connection and opposition to life. On the other hand, Winfield does seem to insist that mind can only be captured by a logic of internal purposes, but ultimately, that logic of self-determination is thought more along the lines of the autonomy of conceptual determination. Since Winfield himself insists that mind and its activities, including its conceptual activities, can only be explained with reference to living form, it then seems crucial to ask what the relevant relation is between living self-activity and conceptual self-determination. Winfield does not finally settle on a precise position regarding the relation between mind and life (p.58), but this question will return in the discussion of the relation between logic and psychology below.

III. Consciousness, Discursivity, and Language

Chapters four, five, and six discuss consciousness, theoretical and practical mind respectively, and present an argument against both the reduction of mind to consciousness, and the equating of consciousness with discursive and linguistic capacities. In these chapters, most of Winfield's arguments come from the reconstruction of the development from consciousness to thinking proper, demonstrating how for Hegel, many aspects of mindedness cannot involve concepts or language. Although Winfield names Sellars, Brandom, and Davidson as villains here, they are never cited directly (except Davidson, who is discussed in chapter seven), and his target seems to be, broadly speaking, theories of pragmatic and linguistic holism where thought and language coincide, making all knowledge dependent on linguistic practices.

Winfield begins by challenging the Cartesian orthodoxy that consciousness depends on self-consciousness, suggesting that the 'privileged certainty' of self-consciousness leads inevitably to solipsism and skepticism (p.59). Rather, Winfield presents the development in the phenomenology section from consciousness to self-consciousness as demonstrating that 'self-consciousness must presuppose consciousness if to be self-conscious is to be conscious of one's consciousness,' and that 'neither self-consciousness nor consciousness can be primary' because 'consciousness depends upon the disengagement by which self-feeling becomes sensation of something objective, [and] self-consciousness depends upon consciousness as the object of its own disengaged awareness' (p.60). Not only are consciousness and self-consciousness dependent on the self-feeling, pre-discursive, and largely unconscious soul (EPM §409), but self-consciousness is also dependent upon consciousness of an object that is distinguished from consciousness itself. Again, referring to Kant, Strawson, and Merleau-Ponty, Winfield further argues that self-consciousness requires not only consciousness of objects, but individuation in a unique body of which it is also aware (pp.61–7).

The next step in Winfield's argument concerns self-consciousness and its relation to others, and it is here that the objection against Sellars et al. is raised. Winfield writes:

> What allegedly connects these three forms of consciousness [of self, of objects, of others] is the supposed bond between knowledge and linguistic intelligence. On this view, knowledge involves truth claims, which take the form of propositions . . . Because propositions and the concepts they contain involve language, and because language cannot be private, knowledge rests upon linguistic intelligence and the interaction among interlocutors on which language and thought depend . . . self-consciousness will necessarily be discursive, involving propositional knowledge . . . Not only is solipsism precluded, but so is any skepticism of other minds. The proponents of this view have generally attached it

> to an epistemological foundationalism by treating the linguistic conditions of meaning as conditions of truth. Because these conditions involve interwoven conventions that are contingent, treating them as epistemological foundations leads to a pragmatic holism, where all terms and standards of justification are regarded as just as corrigible and contingent as the conventions they rest upon. (pp.67–8)

Winfield's argument has two parts, one negative and one positive. First, and negatively, although self-consciousness indeed requires awareness of other minds, he argues that this kind of linguistic, pragmatic holism is 'self-defeating' (p.68), and presents the problem as a kind of false dilemma between foundationalism and relativism. In tying together the linguistic conditions of meaning with conditions for truth and knowledge, pragmatic holism cannot account for the authority of the very linguistic conditions that it privileges as foundational or necessarily truth-conditioning. Winfield presents the problem as an either/or, where both options are undesirable: either linguistic conditions of meaning are taken as privileged conditions for truth and knowledge, meaning that they fall outside of the realm of knowledge that they condition and cannot account for or ground themselves; or linguistic conditions are simply one set of the many conditions within the realm of knowledge and thereby lose their status as *privileged* conditions, leading to a 'relativist holism' (p.2) where one condition for knowledge is as contingent as any other. Winfield points out that this is a problem for all philosophical theories that seek 'transcendental conditions for knowledge,' entailing that any theory which is grounded in an external, privileged 'foundation' will be unable to ward off relativism and skepticism. Although Winfield's objections here are generally sound, they remain underdeveloped for at least two reasons. First, Winfield does not determine very precisely what he takes 'foundationalism' and 'relativism' to be nor the relevant senses in which they are problematic, simply assuming from the outset that they are epistemologically unsound positions. On its own, this assumption is not *necessarily* problematic, but it becomes immensely problematic when, secondly, Winfield attributes these vague positions to both Sellars and Brandom (I will leave Davidson aside for the moment) without any direct references to specific arguments in their work. Although it is not my intention to defend these thinkers here, the questions of whether and how Sellars and Brandom are linguistic idealists as well as how these questions specifically connect or depart from Hegelian themes are certainly deep and complicated enough to warrant a more generous discussion than Winfield has presented.[19]

The second and positive part of Winfield's argument against Sellars and Sellarsian approaches to mind and language is much larger in scale, ultimately involving a defense of a particular way of reading Hegel's system. To begin more locally, Winfield argues that self-consciousness is not only conditioned by the self-feeling of the unconscious, pre-discursive soul, but that 'self-consciousness as such

need not be discursive, nor involve discursive knowledge. . . . [S]elf-consciousness must involve an awareness that can distinguish subject and object without thinking concepts and making judgments' (p.69). That self-consciousness in general first appears as desire (*Begierde*) lends credence to Winfield's claim, and he further suggests that even the recognitive desire characteristic of a primitive form of intersubjectivity need not entail full discursivity. However, even if for the sake of argument we accept Winfield's broad rejection of certain forms of linguistic idealism, and bracket for the moment whether or not this charge applies to Sellars and Brandom, Hegel's own position again does not quite match up with Winfield's understanding. For Hegel, Concept (*der Begriff*) and judgement (*das Urteil*), while indeed referring to predication in language, also refer much more broadly to distinctions and relations that are first present in life, and the question of discursivity does not fully map onto Hegel's analysis of concepts and judgments as such. Hegel refers to life as the *immediate* Concept (meaning an *immediate* relation between a living individual and its universal or genus), and the very distinction between subject and object, some relation between inner and outer, is a "judgment" (*Ur-teil*) or "original division [*ursprüngliche Teilung*]" of life itself.[20] This means that concepts, judgments, and even syllogisms (taken in a very loose sense, not in the form of language or thought) are present and in use for living things, especially for all animal organisms, and certainly for *Geist* as soul and consciousness, even where linguistic capacities are not yet developed. For Hegel, even if not for so-called pragmatic holism, concepts and judgments are not reducible to language, even if language is the primary way in which they are expressed and organized for human beings.

In order to show how thinking and language develop, chapter five reconstructs the arguments from the section on theoretical mind. Whereas consciousness 'registers the fit between its own mental determinations and the objectivity from which it distinguishes itself' at the level of *certainty*, theoretical mind must come to conceptually grasp that same fit between subject and object, overcoming the opposition of consciousness in order to constitute knowledge (p.76). The reconstruction of the development from intuition to representation (including recollection, imagination, and memory) to conceptual thinking proper is presented with both insight and clarity, making it an invaluable contribution to scholarship on Hegel's philosophy of mind. Chapter six continues to stress the non-discursive aspects of mental life on the side of practical mind, and Winfield argues that Hegel presents us with a 'series of forms of willing' that do not involve thought or language, namely, practical feeling, urges, and willfulness (p.106). Only the last stage of practical mind, happiness, involves concepts proper, thus finally providing all the conditions for the rational form of the free will that is the protagonist of objective spirit and the well-known *Philosophy of Right*.

IV. Skepticism, Anti-Foundationalism, and Truth

To complete the positive aspect of his argument against pragmatic holism and to get 'beyond the sociality of reason,' Winfield concludes, in chapter seven, by laying out his reading of Hegel's *Logic* and what he takes to be the disconnection between logic and psychology.[21] Diagnosing representational knowing and foundationalism as the twin evils of modern epistemology that are ultimately unable to answer the skeptical challenge, Winfield presents what he takes to be the Hegelian alternative, namely, a self-determining presuppositionless thinking without foundations that guarantees truth (logic), which must be distinguished from the psychological conditions for rational thought (subjective spirit). Like all other *realphilosophische* conditions (for example, natural processes, history, social and political institutions, etc.), Winfield suggests that psychological conditions for thinking enable *all* thoughts, and thus, do not concern truth conditions at all and have 'no epistemological or foundational significance' (p.133).

Representational thinking and foundationalism go together insofar as both presuppose an unbridgeable gulf between representation and what is represented (pp.123ff.). So long as this gulf remains, knowledge and the validity of said representation will be dependent on some externally given factor, whether this is an independent object, the unity of consciousness, language, convention, 'normal conditions,' etc. This external given will serve as a 'foundation' for knowledge insofar as the validity—truth or falsity—of representations is also dependent on the arbitrarily chosen validity conferring given. Winfield argues that this is the 'basic blunder' of modern epistemology that renders it unsalvageable, as well as helpless against skepticism (p.130). Although Davidson is initially enlisted as an ally of Hegel's, his position is ultimately rejected, first, because the conditions of interpretation cannot 'guarantee that belief is by and large veridical,' and secondly, because Davidson does not fully sever 'the tie between meaning determination and the truth of belief' (pp.138–9). To bring us to the 'threshold' of the Hegelian alternative of 'philosophy without foundations,' all we need to do is recognise that the 'enabling conditions of discourse can have no hold upon the determination of truth' (p.140).

The issues here are as vast as they are complicated, and I will limit myself to very brief remarks on two points of discussion. The first concerns the problem of skepticism, how Winfield and Hegel understand skepticism, and what would count as a sufficient answer to it. Although Winfield's diagnosis of modern epistemology is generally apt, he seems to think that answering the skeptical challenge entails somehow *guaranteeing truth*, a thought that confuses answering the problems of skepticism with generating an impenetrable armour against fallibility. This is why he claims that the general conditions of thinking, meaning, discourse, etc.—*realphilosophische* conditions that are more or less contingent and enable all thought without distinguishing between true and false—have to be clearly distinguished from truth conditions—a matter of logic—and that the latter, furthermore, cannot confer truth in a way that presupposes the opposition of consciousness, but must proceed as

purely autonomous self-determination without *any* presuppositions, foundations, or subject/object distinction.[22] Only a fully self-determining logic that does not accept any presuppositions but generates its own determinacy can guarantee truth without falling into either foundationalism or relativism.

Thus, although Winfield rejects the foundationalist enterprise, he does not reject the model of truth that it is meant to guarantee, namely, absolute timeless truth that is invulnerable to change, objection, or transformation. The difference is simply that he thinks such truth can only be generated and guaranteed by a presuppositionless and autonomous logic. Even if one grants the possibility of such a logical enterprise and that it is in fact Hegel's, it seems that it does not directly address the more specific problems of external world skepticism or skepticism about other minds, both of which Winfield himself attacks at the level of subjective spirit, rather than at the level of logic. Furthermore, rather than overcoming skepticism, the kind of self-enclosed, purely autonomous, self-generating logic that is impervious to anything in the real world described by Winfield would only fuel the fires of skepticism insofar as the clear separation of the logical from 'non-logical reality' simply re-describes the gap between thinking and being at a different register (p.144).

Hegel's own views on skepticism also differ significantly from Winfield's, insofar as he rejects modern skepticism in favour of ancient skepticism[23] and draws an important distinction between various skepticisms, one that has an important bearing on how he will choose to answer the skeptic. In the introduction to the *Phenomenology*, Hegel distinguishes between mere doubts (*Zweifel*), characteristic of modern skepticisms that doubt particular truths while hanging on to some dogmatically chosen ground,[24] and despair *(Verzweiflung*), a kind of 'thoroughgoing skepticism' that directs itself against 'the whole range of phenomenal consciousness' (PS ¶78/3:72). This path of consciousness constitutes 'the detailed history of the *education* of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science,' which means that the *Phenomenology* is itself a skeptical path (a 'way of despair') that battles abstract forms of one-sided skepticisms and, hence, provides the conditions for speculative logic. For Hegel, therefore, addressing the problems of skepticism is not only a logical or even epistemological matter, but concerns an entire intellectual and ethical history of *Geist*, one that constitutes and results in a kind of *truth*—precisely truth concerning the human and truth as such, the object of the *Philosophy of Mind*.[25] Not only is the relation between logic and psychology (forms of mindedness, shapes of consciousness) more complicated than Winfield allows, but what Hegel means by truth will also differ vastly from what is discussed under the same term by theories that fluctuate between foundationalism and relativism.

This brings us to the second point of discussion, which concerns the issue of truth itself. For Hegel, truth does not exclude what is false as something external to itself (PS ¶47/3:46). Far from having 'no bearing' (p.138) on the distinction between truth and falsity, mind and its processes of development are themselves a form of

truth and a condition for truth, exemplifying the kind of self-relating, internally purposive structure that Winfield himself champions as the key distinction between mind and machine. Winfield's wavering concerning the relation between mind and life leads him to revert to an externally purposive relation between logic and *Geist*, severing mind and truth in a way that is decidedly contrary to Hegel's philosophy. That mind is the most developed, most concrete form of the Idea (EPM §377) should make it the highest form of self-actualising truth, one that, beyond the poles of foundationalism and relativism, continually gives shape to human existence. Here again, Winfield's analysis would have benefited from further discussion of the systematic meaning of *Geist* and why Hegel regards it as the highest and most difficult form of truth. Nonetheless, *Hegel and Mind* is a worthwhile contribution to Hegel scholarship, both in offering a concise and lucid reconstruction of Hegel's subjective spirit, and in raising important questions regarding the general nature of mind in connection with Hegelian themes as well as broader contemporary debates.

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Notes

Abbreviations:

PS: *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 (cited by paragraph number)/*Phänomenlogie des Geistes*, vol. 3 of *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970 (cited by volume and page number).

SL: *Science of Logic* (1812–16), trans. A.V. Miller. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1969 (cited by page number)/*Wissenschaft der Logik*, vols. 5 and 6 of *Werke* (cited by volume and page number).

EPN: *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, *Part II: Philosophy of Nature* (1817/1830), trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970 (cited by section number)/*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830): Zweiter Teil. Die Naturphilosophie mit den mündlichen Zusätzen*, vol. 9 of *Werke* (cited by section number).

EPM: *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part III: The Philosophy of Mind* (1817–30), trans. W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, rev. Michael Inwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 (cited by section number)/*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830): Dritter Teil Die Philosophie des Geistes mit den mündlichen Zusätzen*, vol. 10 of *Werke* (cited by section number).

[1] The first and only mention of '*Geist*' in Winfield's book occurs near the end of the first chapter on page 20 where he speaks of the transition from phenomenology to psychology: 'Hegel characterises intelligence (*Geist*) as the resultant truth that is aware of what it is.'

[2] Winfield uses psyche, consciousness, and intelligence to translate *die Seele*, *das Bewußtsein*, and *der Geist* respectively, the three stages of development in Hegel's subjective spirit. I will follow Wallace, Miller, and Inwood and use 'soul', 'consciousness', and 'mind'. Since Winfield often deviates from the standard translations (or uses the older translations) I will note when he does so. However, the use of 'intelligence' for *Geist* in the context of psychology is misleading because *Intelligenz* has the specific sense of theoretical mind, which Hegel contrasts here to practical mind as *Wille*.

[3] Although Winfield is correct that Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* is generally neglected in the literature, I do not agree with his assessment of the *Phenomenology* as a 'wholly negative' investigation that 'does not give a positive account of mind' (pp.xii, xi).

[4] This trope appears everywhere in Hegel, but see for example EPM §378Z.

[5] See for example EPM §379.

[6] Winfield refers to *Begierde* as both desire and appetite.

[7] This development parallels the development in the *Phenomenology*.

[8] Winfield refers to *Triebe* as impulses and *Willkür* as choice.

[9] Winfield cites in particular Roger Penrose, *The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[10] See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), pp. 244–55/*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, vol. 10 of *Werkausgabe in 12 Bänden*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 313–24.

[11] *Critique of Judgment*, p. 251/*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p. 320.

[12] Ibid.

[13] *Critique of Judgment*, p. 249/*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p. 318.

[14] See SL 737, 766/6:440–41, 476.

[15] See for example SL 764–5/6:473–75 and PS ¶170/3:140–41.

[16] See SL 764/6:474 ff.

[17] See EPN §337. Hegel also writes of the organism: 'The *subjectivity* in virtue of which organic being exists as a *singular* [Einzelnes], unfolds itself into an *objective* organism in the shape of a body articulated into parts which are *separate* and *distinct*' (EPN §343).

[18] Rather than following Hegel here, and against Aristotle, Winfield instead turns to Plato, arguing that whereas organic unity and organisation can be likened to the 'City of Pigs' in the *Republic*, the unity of mind and body requires understanding mind as the 'ruling function' or 'ruling element' (p.33).

[19] The question of whether or not Sellars is guilty of reducing all awareness and thought to language and therefore, is a proponent of a kind of linguistic idealism, is a topic of much debate. See for example his exchange with Chisholm in Roderick M. Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars, 'Intentionality and the Mental,' in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Volume II: Concepts,*

Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, ed. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 507–39; and John McDowell, 'Why Is Sellars's Essay Called '*Empiricism* and the Philosophy of Mind'?' in *Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). On the question of linguistic idealism and relativism in Brandom, see for example, Richard Rorty, 'What do you do when they call you a 'Relativist'?' and Robert Brandom, 'Replies,' in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57:1 (March 1997), pp. 173–177 and pp. 189–204.

[20] See for example SL 764/6:473.

[21] As in the title of his book, Winfield is using the term psychology here broadly to refer to mental reality as it is developed in the subjective spirit and not only to the psychology section within subjective spirit.

[22] Winfield writes of logic that it is 'the valid thinking of valid thinking,' and '[t]he truth of what presuppositionlessly develops [from logical determination] will lie precisely in the autonomy of its emergence' (pp.140, 141).

[23] Hegel and Winfield do agree however, in that both attack the modern epistemological tendency towards representationalism and foundationalism (what Hegel calls dogmatism). See the introduction to the *Phenomenology*, and G.W.F. Hegel, 'On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One,' trans. H.S. Harris, in *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Philosophy*, ed. George Di Giovanni and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), pp. 311–62. See also Michael N. Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Robert Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 5; and Paul Franks, 'Ancient Skepticism, Modern Naturalism, and Nihilism in Hegel's Early Jena Writings,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and 19th Century Philosophy*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 52–73.

[24] Descartes is exemplary of this form of doubt.

[25] EPM §377.